1 00:00:09,790 --> 00:00:05,820 foreign 2 00:00:12,830 --> 00:00:09,800 [Music] 3 00:00:15,709 --> 00:00:12,840 they were complex narratives of being 4 00:00:19,689 --> 00:00:15,719 taken by alien beings into UFOs on beams 5 00:00:30,349 --> 00:00:22,490 the Air Force is trying to cover up with 6 00:00:35,270 --> 00:00:32,749 from my own point of view I'm going to 7 00:00:37,010 --> 00:00:35,280 be very disappointed if UFOs turn out to 8 00:00:38,330 --> 00:00:37,020 be nothing more than visit us from 9 00:00:41,930 --> 00:00:38,340 another planet because I think there 10 00:00:41,940 --> 00:00:45,050 foreign 11 00:01:08,330 --> 00:01:04,609 [Music] 12 00:01:09,289 --> 00:01:08,340 hello everybody and welcome back to the 13 00:01:12,109 --> 00:01:09,299 channel 14 00:01:14,870 --> 00:01:12,119 it has been a crazy few days for the UFO 15 00:01:16,789 --> 00:01:14,880 subject with the report dropping and you 16 00:01:18,109 --> 00:01:16,799 know it's been talked about on all the 17 00:01:20,090 --> 00:01:18,119 other channels so I feel like I'm 18 00:01:21,649 --> 00:01:20,100 playing catch up to those guys but you 19 00:01:24,050 --> 00:01:21,659 know I did want to come on and cover it 20 00:01:27,530 --> 00:01:24,060 and I've brought two awesome guests with 21 00:01:29,390 --> 00:01:27,540 me who I'll bring on in one second uh 22 00:01:31,730 --> 00:01:29,400 just the usual house rules if you could 23 00:01:33,469 --> 00:01:31,740 keep the chat nice and cool calm and 24 00:01:35,569 --> 00:01:33,479 collected I would really appreciate that 25 00:01:38,630 --> 00:01:35,579 it's okay to have differences of opinion 26 00:01:40,730 --> 00:01:38,640 we all kind of uh take different things 27 00:01:43,670 --> 00:01:40,740 from this report if anything at all 28 00:01:45,649 --> 00:01:43,680 because it wasn't exactly uh brimming 29 00:01:47,210 --> 00:01:45,659 with information but we'll we'll try and 30 00:01:49,069 --> 00:01:47,220 break it down as best we can from our 31 00:01:51,590 --> 00:01:49,079 different perspectives 32 00:01:53,450 --> 00:01:51,600 um I also have an exclusive quote from 33 00:01:55,069 --> 00:01:53,460 luellizondo I was lucky enough to have a 34 00:01:57,469 --> 00:01:55,079 chat with Lou about three hours ago 35 00:01:59,090 --> 00:01:57,479 about the report so lose provided me 36 00:02:01,069 --> 00:01:59,100 with a short statement which is always 37 00:02:01,789 --> 00:02:01,079 interesting to to hear that point of 38 00:02:04,249 --> 00:02:01,799 view 39 00:02:05,929 --> 00:02:04,259 so yeah any questions that you guys have 40 00:02:07,190 --> 00:02:05,939 throughout please pop them in capital 41 00:02:09,050 --> 00:02:07,200 letters 42 00:02:10,910 --> 00:02:09,060 um yeah and they'll we'll try and get to 43 00:02:12,650 --> 00:02:10,920 them at some point if they're relevant 44 00:02:14,869 --> 00:02:12,660 to that particular moment I will try my 45 00:02:17,150 --> 00:02:14,879 best to read them there and then if not 46 00:02:19,309 --> 00:02:17,160 we'll get to them towards the end of the 47 00:02:21,290 --> 00:02:19,319 discussion so let's start this off by 48 00:02:23,869 --> 00:02:21,300 bringing in my guests so first up I'd 49 00:02:25,729 --> 00:02:23,879 like to welcome Katie Howland Katie how 50 00:02:27,410 --> 00:02:25,739 are you doing you're doing great thanks 51 00:02:29,690 --> 00:02:27,420 for having me Vinnie it's my pleasure 52 00:02:31,790 --> 00:02:29,700 thank you so much I always value your 53 00:02:33,589 --> 00:02:31,800 your input when we're talking about this 54 00:02:35,270 --> 00:02:33,599 aspect of the phenomena and others of 55 00:02:38,270 --> 00:02:35,280 course but yeah I really do appreciate 56 00:02:40,430 --> 00:02:38,280 you being here uh and next up uh we have 57 00:02:43,130 --> 00:02:40,440 my good friend Mr Christopher sharp 58 00:02:46,070 --> 00:02:43,140 Chris welcome back hey brother such 59 00:02:48,290 --> 00:02:46,080 Delight being here with you and Katie I 60 00:02:50,570 --> 00:02:48,300 admire you both so much not only is just 61 00:02:51,949 --> 00:02:50,580 like people who are so well versed in 62 00:02:54,350 --> 00:02:51,959 this topic but it's just fantastic 63 00:02:56,270 --> 00:02:54,360 friends and human beings really so thank 64 00:02:57,589 --> 00:02:56,280 you thank you so much so that's really 65 00:02:59,210 --> 00:02:57,599 kind of you to say 66 00:03:00,949 --> 00:02:59,220 um and yeah it wasn't that long ago you 67 00:03:03,949 --> 00:03:00,959 were here discussing the discussing the 68 00:03:06,470 --> 00:03:03,959 ndaa so it's nice to have you back to to 69 00:03:07,970 --> 00:03:06,480 kind of go over this report and uh Katie 70 00:03:09,770 --> 00:03:07,980 with your experience on the hill and 71 00:03:11,330 --> 00:03:09,780 things like that I think it really is uh 72 00:03:13,970 --> 00:03:11,340 really informative having you here to 73 00:03:16,190 --> 00:03:13,980 kind of weigh in on what we can kind of 74 00:03:18,890 --> 00:03:16,200 pull out of this report 75 00:03:20,449 --> 00:03:18,900 um so yeah I guess we should just jump 76 00:03:22,369 --> 00:03:20,459 into it we'll kind of go through it we 77 00:03:24,050 --> 00:03:22,379 won't read it word for word so if I do 78 00:03:26,930 --> 00:03:24,060 scroll past anything that you think was 79 00:03:29,690 --> 00:03:26,940 important please let me know and yeah 80 00:03:31,610 --> 00:03:29,700 let's let's get to it it was quite I 81 00:03:33,229 --> 00:03:31,620 remember when I first opened the page 82 00:03:35,030 --> 00:03:33,239 and refreshed it and it was there I was 83 00:03:38,149 --> 00:03:35,040 just like oh here we go 84 00:03:39,830 --> 00:03:38,159 so uh yeah let's get into it 85 00:03:42,350 --> 00:03:39,840 so obviously we have the table of 86 00:03:44,449 --> 00:03:42,360 contents let's skip that the executive 87 00:03:47,330 --> 00:03:44,459 summary I mean 88 00:03:48,890 --> 00:03:47,340 it kind of to me it was great to see 89 00:03:50,509 --> 00:03:48,900 that the number of cases had jumped up 90 00:03:52,970 --> 00:03:50,519 to 510 91 00:03:55,850 --> 00:03:52,980 I mean my initial thoughts were it I'd 92 00:03:58,250 --> 00:03:55,860 imagine that the the reporting processes 93 00:03:59,449 --> 00:03:58,260 have given us these uh new numbers 94 00:04:01,130 --> 00:03:59,459 because 95 00:04:02,869 --> 00:04:01,140 am I do you think I'm right in saying 96 00:04:05,809 --> 00:04:02,879 that the stigma is slightly starting to 97 00:04:08,750 --> 00:04:05,819 drop with regards to aviators and 98 00:04:11,089 --> 00:04:08,760 military personnel coming forward 99 00:04:13,729 --> 00:04:11,099 you go first Katie 100 00:04:15,830 --> 00:04:13,739 I mean I think it obviously is 101 00:04:16,909 --> 00:04:15,840 it has been such an increase in 102 00:04:18,830 --> 00:04:16,919 the world and I think we have to realize 103 00:04:21,289 --> 00:04:18,840 that 104 00:04:23,030 --> 00:04:21,299 relatively short amount of time I mean 105 00:04:25,010 --> 00:04:23,040 it's one thing for us who are constantly 106 00:04:27,230 --> 00:04:25,020 looking at this to go oh only a couple 107 00:04:30,350 --> 00:04:27,240 hundred more you know um but that's 108 00:04:33,170 --> 00:04:30,360 that's huge in a short amount of time 109 00:04:36,050 --> 00:04:33,180 um I also think that you know we're 110 00:04:39,230 --> 00:04:36,060 going to see a rapid increase just as 111 00:04:41,450 --> 00:04:39,240 public education on the topic 112 00:04:43,969 --> 00:04:41,460 um happens because I think a lot of 113 00:04:46,189 --> 00:04:43,979 folks are just used to the status quo of 114 00:04:47,990 --> 00:04:46,199 not reporting not talking about it 115 00:04:49,670 --> 00:04:48,000 um but as it's more in the news we've 116 00:04:50,810 --> 00:04:49,680 seen a lot of media coverage lately I 117 00:04:52,430 --> 00:04:50,820 think we're going to see those numbers 118 00:04:54,050 --> 00:04:52,440 Skyrocket 119 00:04:56,150 --> 00:04:54,060 um I'm an epidemiologist by background 120 00:04:58,189 --> 00:04:56,160 and one of the first things they teach 121 00:04:59,990 --> 00:04:58,199 you is just because you see an increase 122 00:05:02,870 --> 00:05:00,000 in reports doesn't mean there's an 123 00:05:04,790 --> 00:05:02,880 increase in the actual sightings right A 124 00:05:07,249 --> 00:05:04,800 lot of times better identification 125 00:05:08,870 --> 00:05:07,259 better definition 126 00:05:11,090 --> 00:05:08,880 um less stigma and I think that's 127 00:05:13,129 --> 00:05:11,100 definitely what we're seeing here 128 00:05:15,650 --> 00:05:13,139 yeah Chris what do you think 129 00:05:18,110 --> 00:05:15,660 yes yes Stephanie um it's going away 130 00:05:20,570 --> 00:05:18,120 what they're trying to focus on now is 131 00:05:23,870 --> 00:05:20,580 submariners which is something which is 132 00:05:26,810 --> 00:05:23,880 made clear in the round table discussion 133 00:05:28,550 --> 00:05:26,820 we had with Moultrie and Kirkpatrick and 134 00:05:30,710 --> 00:05:28,560 that's a really big thing in terms of 135 00:05:33,590 --> 00:05:30,720 the um the definition and identified 136 00:05:34,790 --> 00:05:33,600 anomalous uh phenomena um so it doesn't 137 00:05:37,010 --> 00:05:34,800 have that 138 00:05:39,110 --> 00:05:37,020 um aerial connotation anymore so that's 139 00:05:40,909 --> 00:05:39,120 really what they're keen on now is 140 00:05:43,490 --> 00:05:40,919 breaking through that Dam which is the 141 00:05:45,409 --> 00:05:43,500 submariners yeah and do you think it's 142 00:05:48,950 --> 00:05:45,419 important to clarify that this is this 143 00:05:50,650 --> 00:05:48,960 was mandated by Congress for the fiscal 144 00:05:54,050 --> 00:05:50,660 year 2022 145 00:05:56,029 --> 00:05:54,060 ndaa so we have seen new language you 146 00:05:58,610 --> 00:05:56,039 know sign into law back around Christmas 147 00:06:02,150 --> 00:05:58,620 time but that's not relevant to this as 148 00:06:05,510 --> 00:06:02,160 such am I right in sort of saying that 149 00:06:09,350 --> 00:06:05,520 I mean I think what you saw in the 2023 150 00:06:11,330 --> 00:06:09,360 ndaa was less focused on 151 00:06:14,090 --> 00:06:11,340 um definitions right other than the 152 00:06:16,670 --> 00:06:14,100 terminology terminology shift from to an 153 00:06:18,350 --> 00:06:16,680 unidentified anomalous phenomena so I 154 00:06:20,210 --> 00:06:18,360 don't think that's going to affect the 155 00:06:21,590 --> 00:06:20,220 number of reports 156 00:06:22,850 --> 00:06:21,600 um that are going to affect the 157 00:06:25,010 --> 00:06:22,860 Whistleblower 158 00:06:27,350 --> 00:06:25,020 um side of things and the industry 159 00:06:30,469 --> 00:06:27,360 reports of ndas and that kind of thing 160 00:06:32,090 --> 00:06:30,479 so I wouldn't expect this year's ndaa to 161 00:06:34,189 --> 00:06:32,100 dramatically 162 00:06:38,990 --> 00:06:34,199 um affect the number of reports we're 163 00:06:44,210 --> 00:06:41,629 and did anyone I mean it was interesting 164 00:06:46,730 --> 00:06:44,220 to see Nim Aviation for me personally 165 00:06:48,650 --> 00:06:46,740 when that when I saw that in that page I 166 00:06:51,650 --> 00:06:48,660 was like okay because you know we we saw 167 00:06:55,189 --> 00:06:51,660 that debacle with the logo uh last year 168 00:06:58,370 --> 00:06:55,199 like any thoughts on that at all 169 00:07:00,830 --> 00:06:58,380 right go for it 170 00:07:01,969 --> 00:07:00,840 um yeah that's very very interesting 171 00:07:03,830 --> 00:07:01,979 that is 172 00:07:05,390 --> 00:07:03,840 um I mean 173 00:07:08,150 --> 00:07:05,400 um I don't know how much I can really 174 00:07:10,790 --> 00:07:08,160 say about this but um yeah sorry it's a 175 00:07:12,469 --> 00:07:10,800 journalist problem but um yeah I think 176 00:07:15,290 --> 00:07:12,479 they've played a really big part of the 177 00:07:16,790 --> 00:07:15,300 report let's say but um I'd try to point 178 00:07:19,070 --> 00:07:16,800 out that I was just looking at it over 179 00:07:20,029 --> 00:07:19,080 again I can't see the doe in there 180 00:07:22,969 --> 00:07:20,039 anywhere 181 00:07:25,850 --> 00:07:22,979 so the report was to actually 182 00:07:29,870 --> 00:07:25,860 look into kind of like incidents 183 00:07:34,070 --> 00:07:29,880 relating to nuclear assets as well 184 00:07:34,969 --> 00:07:34,080 um which was within the ndaa 2022 185 00:07:38,089 --> 00:07:34,979 um 186 00:07:40,870 --> 00:07:38,099 so that that's really interesting so was 187 00:07:43,249 --> 00:07:40,880 that the doe not 188 00:07:44,749 --> 00:07:43,259 cooperating to some extent I mean that'd 189 00:07:46,370 --> 00:07:44,759 be interesting to find out well I think 190 00:07:48,170 --> 00:07:46,380 you meant you may have mentioned before 191 00:07:50,930 --> 00:07:48,180 Katie that 192 00:07:53,150 --> 00:07:50,940 um maybe it's just the case that this 193 00:07:53,870 --> 00:07:53,160 information is so sensitive it may have 194 00:07:56,089 --> 00:07:53,880 not 195 00:07:58,430 --> 00:07:56,099 been within the unclassified version 196 00:08:00,170 --> 00:07:58,440 regardless but um yeah that's an 197 00:08:02,330 --> 00:08:00,180 interesting question to ponder 198 00:08:03,770 --> 00:08:02,340 yeah I think we're talking about I think 199 00:08:06,230 --> 00:08:03,780 what in the admin 200 00:08:08,870 --> 00:08:06,240 AR sections I think it's like mno 201 00:08:12,110 --> 00:08:08,880 perhaps that have to do with nuclear 202 00:08:14,629 --> 00:08:12,120 technology or facilities and absolutely 203 00:08:17,210 --> 00:08:14,639 I I fully expect that none of that will 204 00:08:19,129 --> 00:08:17,220 ever be in an unclassified setting and 205 00:08:21,290 --> 00:08:19,139 frankly I don't think it should be it's 206 00:08:24,170 --> 00:08:21,300 just such a sensitive topic 207 00:08:26,869 --> 00:08:24,180 um but I would be very very shocked to 208 00:08:29,570 --> 00:08:26,879 see members of Congress talk about this 209 00:08:31,909 --> 00:08:29,580 report so positively if it had been 210 00:08:33,529 --> 00:08:31,919 straight up ignored in the classified 211 00:08:35,810 --> 00:08:33,539 version so that's kind of what I was 212 00:08:39,529 --> 00:08:35,820 paying attention to and most members of 213 00:08:42,230 --> 00:08:39,539 Congress uh Timber aside seemed pretty 214 00:08:43,550 --> 00:08:42,240 uh pretty pleased at least preliminarily 215 00:08:45,350 --> 00:08:43,560 with the report 216 00:08:46,790 --> 00:08:45,360 yeah and we do see on this next page 217 00:08:48,769 --> 00:08:46,800 that it does state that the report was 218 00:08:50,449 --> 00:08:48,779 drafted by Nim aviation in conjunction 219 00:08:52,190 --> 00:08:50,459 with arrow but then in that list of all 220 00:08:54,650 --> 00:08:52,200 the different agencies below we do see 221 00:08:56,990 --> 00:08:54,660 the doe listed in there which is 222 00:08:58,610 --> 00:08:57,000 interesting but does it seem to you in 223 00:09:01,370 --> 00:08:58,620 any way that we're seeing more 224 00:09:04,070 --> 00:09:01,380 collaboration and good efforts between 225 00:09:05,509 --> 00:09:04,080 all the sort of uh interagencies and the 226 00:09:06,949 --> 00:09:05,519 the military branches coming together a 227 00:09:08,750 --> 00:09:06,959 little bit better than they were maybe 228 00:09:12,310 --> 00:09:08,760 for the preliminary assessment back in 229 00:09:16,490 --> 00:09:15,050 uh yeah I think the agencies are working 230 00:09:19,930 --> 00:09:16,500 closely together now and all the 231 00:09:24,470 --> 00:09:19,940 different offices and whatnot um I think 232 00:09:27,170 --> 00:09:24,480 I I think you're going to see 233 00:09:30,170 --> 00:09:27,180 um other agencies that say take an 234 00:09:32,269 --> 00:09:30,180 active interested in this whether that 235 00:09:33,530 --> 00:09:32,279 just leaks out or if it's made public by 236 00:09:37,310 --> 00:09:33,540 that 237 00:09:39,170 --> 00:09:37,320 military like Spaceballs for example I 238 00:09:41,509 --> 00:09:39,180 think we now know that space force is 239 00:09:45,170 --> 00:09:41,519 looking into UAP 240 00:09:47,930 --> 00:09:45,180 um that's why Lou was working there and 241 00:09:49,910 --> 00:09:47,940 um that continues so 242 00:09:51,889 --> 00:09:49,920 um hopefully we see more kind of like 243 00:09:53,810 --> 00:09:51,899 entering into the sphere 244 00:09:55,610 --> 00:09:53,820 um and we've got NASA as well looking 245 00:09:58,790 --> 00:09:55,620 into it as well 246 00:10:02,090 --> 00:09:58,800 um I think FAA is being played by so 247 00:10:04,430 --> 00:10:02,100 many reports at the moment as well about 248 00:10:06,530 --> 00:10:04,440 um encountering 249 00:10:08,870 --> 00:10:06,540 um strange things in the sky 250 00:10:10,370 --> 00:10:08,880 um which according some Pilots have you 251 00:10:12,730 --> 00:10:10,380 know gone up grammatically within this 252 00:10:15,889 --> 00:10:12,740 past year I mean some of that may be 253 00:10:16,790 --> 00:10:15,899 attributable to um starlink I think it 254 00:10:18,710 --> 00:10:16,800 is 255 00:10:20,150 --> 00:10:18,720 um but there are some cases which you 256 00:10:21,250 --> 00:10:20,160 think well that's doesn't really look 257 00:10:24,470 --> 00:10:21,260 like 258 00:10:28,070 --> 00:10:24,480 Elon Musk satellites 259 00:10:29,829 --> 00:10:28,080 yeah no I I agree I I particularly 260 00:10:32,630 --> 00:10:29,839 zoomed into 261 00:10:34,310 --> 00:10:32,640 odni Nim emerging and disruptive 262 00:10:35,690 --> 00:10:34,320 technology I thought that was a very 263 00:10:39,650 --> 00:10:35,700 interesting 264 00:10:42,889 --> 00:10:39,660 um uh office or or sub component of nim 265 00:10:46,370 --> 00:10:42,899 just because I know for a fact that DOD 266 00:10:49,610 --> 00:10:46,380 set up a new office in the last two 267 00:10:52,970 --> 00:10:49,620 years I thought I'm gonna kill myself I 268 00:10:54,410 --> 00:10:52,980 don't remember uh the exact uh name of 269 00:10:56,210 --> 00:10:54,420 it but it's something very similar to 270 00:10:58,730 --> 00:10:56,220 emerging and disruptive technology I'm 271 00:11:00,230 --> 00:10:58,740 not saying that that's a UAP office but 272 00:11:03,170 --> 00:11:00,240 I think it's interesting to see it 273 00:11:05,509 --> 00:11:03,180 situated within that sub function I 274 00:11:08,210 --> 00:11:05,519 think it's uh relevant it kind of 275 00:11:11,030 --> 00:11:08,220 Harkens back to I think the 276 00:11:12,889 --> 00:11:11,040 um the foreign technology offices that 277 00:11:13,970 --> 00:11:12,899 we hear a lot about in 278 00:11:15,170 --> 00:11:13,980 um you know like the course of 279 00:11:16,850 --> 00:11:15,180 narratives and things like that 280 00:11:18,050 --> 00:11:16,860 regardless of whether or not that's true 281 00:11:19,610 --> 00:11:18,060 I don't know 282 00:11:21,170 --> 00:11:19,620 um but that definitely piqued my 283 00:11:22,910 --> 00:11:21,180 interest a little bit 284 00:11:25,130 --> 00:11:22,920 yeah absolutely and already in these 285 00:11:26,990 --> 00:11:25,140 first few pages we're seeing um Odie and 286 00:11:29,990 --> 00:11:27,000 I mentioned a lot and there's a lack of 287 00:11:31,790 --> 00:11:30,000 OU SDI which was something that I know 288 00:11:33,410 --> 00:11:31,800 Chris you were concerned about and I was 289 00:11:35,930 --> 00:11:33,420 a little bit the way that the office was 290 00:11:38,509 --> 00:11:35,940 sat under them so what do we think so 291 00:11:39,829 --> 00:11:38,519 far with with respect to that do you 292 00:11:40,670 --> 00:11:39,839 think it's better now that it seems to 293 00:11:42,949 --> 00:11:40,680 be 294 00:11:44,389 --> 00:11:42,959 OD and I that's kind of overseeing it if 295 00:11:45,769 --> 00:11:44,399 I'm using the right words I don't know 296 00:11:48,530 --> 00:11:45,779 if I am exactly 297 00:11:50,870 --> 00:11:48,540 yeah yeah sure um so firstly sorry doe 298 00:11:52,870 --> 00:11:50,880 was mentioned I'm looking at the 299 00:11:55,250 --> 00:11:52,880 differences between 2020 300 00:11:56,269 --> 00:11:55,260 22s sorry so I was getting mixed up 301 00:11:58,550 --> 00:11:56,279 between them 302 00:12:01,970 --> 00:11:58,560 um it's at odni yeah so they published 303 00:12:04,970 --> 00:12:01,980 the um 2021 report as well so what 304 00:12:07,790 --> 00:12:04,980 basically happens is that there the the 305 00:12:09,769 --> 00:12:07,800 information the data gets given by 306 00:12:12,350 --> 00:12:09,779 um the office being arrow in in this 307 00:12:14,690 --> 00:12:12,360 case it was you youaptf back then 308 00:12:17,090 --> 00:12:14,700 um to the odni and EOD and I just 309 00:12:18,110 --> 00:12:17,100 coordinate all this stuff basically and 310 00:12:24,110 --> 00:12:18,120 they 311 00:12:26,329 --> 00:12:24,120 um agencies and offices as well just to 312 00:12:28,190 --> 00:12:26,339 ensure that it's all correct and they're 313 00:12:30,350 --> 00:12:28,200 not not publishing anything they should 314 00:12:32,150 --> 00:12:30,360 do and they're all coordinating with 315 00:12:34,610 --> 00:12:32,160 each other before they do this but um 316 00:12:35,630 --> 00:12:34,620 there's also a process as well I mean 317 00:12:38,329 --> 00:12:35,640 um 318 00:12:41,630 --> 00:12:38,339 even though the report has only just 319 00:12:44,030 --> 00:12:41,640 been given to Congress that there is an 320 00:12:46,910 --> 00:12:44,040 ongoing process whereby 321 00:12:50,329 --> 00:12:46,920 um the legislative affairs section of 322 00:12:52,310 --> 00:12:50,339 odni is liaising with um with Congress 323 00:12:55,310 --> 00:12:52,320 and staffers just to ensure that it 324 00:12:57,829 --> 00:12:55,320 matches the the product as they call it 325 00:13:00,650 --> 00:12:57,839 matches the intent as per the National 326 00:13:03,290 --> 00:13:00,660 Defense authorization Act 327 00:13:04,670 --> 00:13:03,300 yeah and I think just to add on to that 328 00:13:05,629 --> 00:13:04,680 one of the interesting things is when 329 00:13:07,730 --> 00:13:05,639 you're looking at the scope and 330 00:13:10,790 --> 00:13:07,740 assumptions page and you look at all of 331 00:13:13,009 --> 00:13:10,800 the various offices that are listed I 332 00:13:16,310 --> 00:13:13,019 think the longer you have that paragraph 333 00:13:17,870 --> 00:13:16,320 the less input the more sanitized this 334 00:13:19,370 --> 00:13:17,880 report is going to be because you have 335 00:13:22,670 --> 00:13:19,380 to realize there are going to be people 336 00:13:25,790 --> 00:13:22,680 in each office who may not be editing 337 00:13:27,949 --> 00:13:25,800 the final report but have say and have 338 00:13:29,569 --> 00:13:27,959 um ideas about what should be said and 339 00:13:31,129 --> 00:13:29,579 shouldn't be said and so I think uh 340 00:13:33,470 --> 00:13:31,139 we'll talk about you know Dr Sean 341 00:13:35,750 --> 00:13:33,480 Kirkpatrick's slides later but I think 342 00:13:37,430 --> 00:13:35,760 what's really interesting is looking at 343 00:13:39,230 --> 00:13:37,440 the big difference between the two and I 344 00:13:42,889 --> 00:13:39,240 think a lot of that can really come down 345 00:13:44,990 --> 00:13:42,899 to the sheer volume of folks in offices 346 00:13:47,449 --> 00:13:45,000 that have input into this report 347 00:13:49,009 --> 00:13:47,459 yeah absolutely that is really 348 00:13:51,470 --> 00:13:49,019 interesting to have kind of both things 349 00:13:53,509 --> 00:13:51,480 almost released a day after one another 350 00:13:55,550 --> 00:13:53,519 to then be able to compare the two to 351 00:13:58,250 --> 00:13:55,560 see the differences it was it spoke 352 00:13:59,750 --> 00:13:58,260 volumes to to some people uh just 353 00:14:01,370 --> 00:13:59,760 sticking with this page I found that 354 00:14:03,110 --> 00:14:01,380 assumptions fairly interesting at the 355 00:14:04,550 --> 00:14:03,120 bottom saying you know that multiple 356 00:14:06,230 --> 00:14:04,560 factors affect the observation and 357 00:14:08,389 --> 00:14:06,240 detection and but then they're going you 358 00:14:10,910 --> 00:14:08,399 know obviously under the assumption that 359 00:14:12,470 --> 00:14:10,920 you're getting clear statements from 360 00:14:14,269 --> 00:14:12,480 these Witnesses you know they're 361 00:14:16,550 --> 00:14:14,279 actually telling what they saw 362 00:14:18,590 --> 00:14:16,560 accurately but then the assumptions that 363 00:14:21,530 --> 00:14:18,600 all the sensor systems are are working 364 00:14:23,210 --> 00:14:21,540 properly as well and I mean it makes me 365 00:14:25,190 --> 00:14:23,220 smile because you you would just have to 366 00:14:26,690 --> 00:14:25,200 assume that this is like multi-billion 367 00:14:28,730 --> 00:14:26,700 dollar equipment that they're talking 368 00:14:31,550 --> 00:14:28,740 about I mean how often does it actually 369 00:14:33,170 --> 00:14:31,560 fail it's it's I I just find it really 370 00:14:35,870 --> 00:14:33,180 interesting that they word things in 371 00:14:37,509 --> 00:14:35,880 certain ways yeah well look when when I 372 00:14:40,009 --> 00:14:37,519 went to the round table 373 00:14:41,930 --> 00:14:40,019 I asked you know 374 00:14:45,050 --> 00:14:41,940 um they had seen anything so I'm just 375 00:14:46,850 --> 00:14:45,060 looking question right now yeah I um I 376 00:14:48,889 --> 00:14:46,860 said have you detected UAP demonstrating 377 00:14:51,110 --> 00:14:48,899 technology which you are unable to 378 00:14:52,970 --> 00:14:51,120 explain because Patrick started going 379 00:14:55,550 --> 00:14:52,980 into that thing yeah there are some 380 00:14:57,949 --> 00:14:55,560 interesting Dynamics there with flights 381 00:15:00,769 --> 00:14:57,959 and then mockery button basically is 382 00:15:02,689 --> 00:15:00,779 saying but Sean is that partly that that 383 00:15:05,449 --> 00:15:02,699 that's something to do with um sensor 384 00:15:07,310 --> 00:15:05,459 phenomenology sir and then Patrick just 385 00:15:09,050 --> 00:15:07,320 went in that direction which is quite 386 00:15:10,850 --> 00:15:09,060 funny because that's probably that 387 00:15:13,189 --> 00:15:10,860 they're trying to gloss it over in the 388 00:15:15,350 --> 00:15:13,199 words of the odni source that spoke to 389 00:15:17,210 --> 00:15:15,360 my colleague in October 390 00:15:18,530 --> 00:15:17,220 um Josh Boswell 391 00:15:21,410 --> 00:15:18,540 um so they're trying to gloss over and 392 00:15:23,569 --> 00:15:21,420 also like if you go on to uh page number 393 00:15:25,430 --> 00:15:23,579 five sorry if you go forward on that 394 00:15:27,710 --> 00:15:25,440 it's kind of got contradicted because it 395 00:15:29,990 --> 00:15:27,720 states on there continued reporting and 396 00:15:32,930 --> 00:15:30,000 robust analysis are providing better 397 00:15:35,269 --> 00:15:32,940 Fidelity on the UAP events but many 398 00:15:37,310 --> 00:15:35,279 cases remain unresolved 399 00:15:38,990 --> 00:15:37,320 so yeah I found that really strange and 400 00:15:40,189 --> 00:15:39,000 you know we can go back to page four in 401 00:15:42,009 --> 00:15:40,199 a minute but we're talking about the 402 00:15:44,509 --> 00:15:42,019 characterizations of all these different 403 00:15:46,310 --> 00:15:44,519 possible things and then they have to 404 00:15:47,750 --> 00:15:46,320 caveat by saying initial 405 00:15:50,410 --> 00:15:47,760 characterization does not mean 406 00:15:52,550 --> 00:15:50,420 positively resolved it's like well 407 00:15:54,769 --> 00:15:52,560 what have you done what have you 408 00:15:56,269 --> 00:15:54,779 actually confirmed like what what are 409 00:15:58,870 --> 00:15:56,279 you doing what are you saying here I 410 00:16:02,090 --> 00:15:58,880 can't kind of grasp that really 411 00:16:04,310 --> 00:16:02,100 honestly it comes down to understanding 412 00:16:06,730 --> 00:16:04,320 the federal government they are never 413 00:16:10,490 --> 00:16:06,740 going to definitively say anything 414 00:16:13,009 --> 00:16:10,500 unless they are 100 sure and so you're 415 00:16:14,509 --> 00:16:13,019 going to see these these caveats layered 416 00:16:16,009 --> 00:16:14,519 on caveats 417 00:16:19,850 --> 00:16:16,019 um because the last thing they want to 418 00:16:22,790 --> 00:16:19,860 do is say oh yeah 163 were characterized 419 00:16:24,710 --> 00:16:22,800 as balloons and then have one turn out 420 00:16:27,050 --> 00:16:24,720 to be something else and then you know 421 00:16:28,430 --> 00:16:27,060 the media pounces on it so I really 422 00:16:31,790 --> 00:16:28,440 think what you're seeing here is a lot 423 00:16:34,970 --> 00:16:31,800 of covering your butt and uh hoping that 424 00:16:36,350 --> 00:16:34,980 you know they will not have to worry 425 00:16:38,930 --> 00:16:36,360 about ever being incorrect about 426 00:16:42,730 --> 00:16:38,940 anything look right here I've got a 427 00:16:47,329 --> 00:16:45,170 yeah what in the world is a balloon-like 428 00:16:49,370 --> 00:16:47,339 entity can we just address that one for 429 00:16:51,949 --> 00:16:49,380 a second like I understand what a 430 00:16:54,530 --> 00:16:51,959 balloon is a balloon identity not so 431 00:16:56,749 --> 00:16:54,540 much I mean entity does scream like 432 00:16:59,749 --> 00:16:56,759 biological 433 00:17:01,129 --> 00:16:59,759 to me it would that's the first thing I 434 00:17:03,650 --> 00:17:01,139 think of you know 435 00:17:05,510 --> 00:17:03,660 um it's just bizarre isn't it what I 436 00:17:07,970 --> 00:17:05,520 imagine is those like wacky inflatable 437 00:17:08,890 --> 00:17:07,980 tube guys I've ever seen those in the 438 00:17:11,809 --> 00:17:08,900 sky 439 00:17:13,490 --> 00:17:11,819 that's yeah that's just incredible isn't 440 00:17:15,169 --> 00:17:13,500 it to see that but before we dig any 441 00:17:16,130 --> 00:17:15,179 deeper on this let's just jump back to 442 00:17:18,890 --> 00:17:16,140 page 443 00:17:20,569 --> 00:17:18,900 four so we've got here it's basically 444 00:17:22,549 --> 00:17:20,579 the establishment of Arrow talking about 445 00:17:23,329 --> 00:17:22,559 the multi-agency collaborations and 446 00:17:26,090 --> 00:17:23,339 stuff 447 00:17:29,150 --> 00:17:26,100 uh yeah I don't think there's much there 448 00:17:30,890 --> 00:17:29,160 that we can't can really dig deep into I 449 00:17:32,570 --> 00:17:30,900 suppose Aviation will remain in the 450 00:17:35,090 --> 00:17:32,580 intelligence community's focal point for 451 00:17:37,070 --> 00:17:35,100 the UAP issue while arrow is the dod 452 00:17:39,409 --> 00:17:37,080 focal point for these issues and related 453 00:17:41,330 --> 00:17:39,419 activities so it does seem that nem 454 00:17:43,370 --> 00:17:41,340 Aviation is right in there dealing with 455 00:17:45,169 --> 00:17:43,380 the the IC side of things does that 456 00:17:48,169 --> 00:17:45,179 surprise anyone at all or is there 457 00:17:50,630 --> 00:17:48,179 anything you can glean from that 458 00:17:52,970 --> 00:17:50,640 no I mean I just assume that within the 459 00:17:54,650 --> 00:17:52,980 odni that's the office that got tasked 460 00:17:56,450 --> 00:17:54,660 with kind of taking the helm on here 461 00:17:59,029 --> 00:17:56,460 because I mean you have to realize odini 462 00:18:01,610 --> 00:17:59,039 is huge so saying that odni is going to 463 00:18:03,289 --> 00:18:01,620 be handling this is incredibly vague so 464 00:18:06,590 --> 00:18:03,299 I don't I don't think that's remarkable 465 00:18:09,529 --> 00:18:06,600 I do think it makes the logo fascinating 466 00:18:12,710 --> 00:18:09,539 and I do think it makes those patches a 467 00:18:14,330 --> 00:18:12,720 lot extra valuable I I agree completely 468 00:18:15,770 --> 00:18:14,340 Chris is there anything you can gain 469 00:18:17,830 --> 00:18:15,780 from this page in particular that you 470 00:18:20,570 --> 00:18:17,840 think is worth pointing out 471 00:18:22,680 --> 00:18:20,580 uh on this particular page 472 00:18:27,230 --> 00:18:25,029 [Music] 473 00:18:28,970 --> 00:18:27,240 this wording sorry things right but just 474 00:18:31,190 --> 00:18:28,980 look in there the broad scope of 475 00:18:32,210 --> 00:18:31,200 authority granted to Arrow things like 476 00:18:34,130 --> 00:18:32,220 that it's 477 00:18:35,990 --> 00:18:34,140 you know 478 00:18:38,450 --> 00:18:36,000 it's just interesting go on sorry I 479 00:18:39,910 --> 00:18:38,460 interrupted 480 00:18:43,610 --> 00:18:39,920 no no 481 00:18:50,110 --> 00:18:45,169 that's one I mean it speaks for itself 482 00:18:53,210 --> 00:18:50,120 really I mean Nim Aviation yeah that 483 00:18:54,710 --> 00:18:53,220 that's interesting 484 00:18:58,310 --> 00:18:54,720 um I can't really say a lot more about 485 00:18:59,870 --> 00:18:58,320 that really interesting let's say 486 00:19:02,090 --> 00:18:59,880 um yeah so 487 00:19:03,350 --> 00:19:02,100 um yeah I mean there's nothing else I 488 00:19:05,210 --> 00:19:03,360 can already say 489 00:19:07,190 --> 00:19:05,220 um on that to be fair but there's a lot 490 00:19:09,890 --> 00:19:07,200 of technicalities on there 491 00:19:11,350 --> 00:19:09,900 um so yeah yeah I think you're right I 492 00:19:13,970 --> 00:19:11,360 think that that's it 493 00:19:16,909 --> 00:19:13,980 one other thing that jumped out on this 494 00:19:18,770 --> 00:19:16,919 page to me real quick before everyone 495 00:19:20,630 --> 00:19:18,780 um when you see in the first paragraph 496 00:19:23,630 --> 00:19:20,640 Arrow will coordinate with other non-ic 497 00:19:26,930 --> 00:19:23,640 agencies including non-ic elements of 498 00:19:28,850 --> 00:19:26,940 DHS that stood out to me um I think what 499 00:19:31,730 --> 00:19:28,860 they're saying there because 500 00:19:33,590 --> 00:19:31,740 I believe I could be wrong I believe FBI 501 00:19:35,029 --> 00:19:33,600 is considered icy 502 00:19:37,010 --> 00:19:35,039 um so it would fall under odni so 503 00:19:38,270 --> 00:19:37,020 they're not talking about FBI here I 504 00:19:40,250 --> 00:19:38,280 think what they're talking about is like 505 00:19:41,630 --> 00:19:40,260 Customs and Border Protection which 506 00:19:43,909 --> 00:19:41,640 stood out to me because we're seeing 507 00:19:45,950 --> 00:19:43,919 lots of reports along the border 508 00:19:47,029 --> 00:19:45,960 um so that that definitely stood out to 509 00:19:49,310 --> 00:19:47,039 me and I think that's something 510 00:19:51,590 --> 00:19:49,320 interesting to pay attention to 511 00:19:53,210 --> 00:19:51,600 yeah that's definitely interesting yeah 512 00:19:55,190 --> 00:19:53,220 well if you want to if they want to talk 513 00:19:57,529 --> 00:19:55,200 about the Border I mean if you think by 514 00:20:00,470 --> 00:19:57,539 like 2004 limits encounter that was kind 515 00:20:02,450 --> 00:20:00,480 of like close to the Border as well in 516 00:20:05,930 --> 00:20:02,460 terms of that area so um I think that's 517 00:20:07,970 --> 00:20:05,940 quite interesting yeah absolutely 518 00:20:10,549 --> 00:20:07,980 maybe I'm biased as a San Diego 519 00:20:12,770 --> 00:20:10,559 border stuff but 520 00:20:14,690 --> 00:20:12,780 we have had reports of a lot of things 521 00:20:16,789 --> 00:20:14,700 across the South American Border as well 522 00:20:18,289 --> 00:20:16,799 Mexico and things like that so it's 523 00:20:19,789 --> 00:20:18,299 certainly worth bearing in mind and I 524 00:20:20,870 --> 00:20:19,799 think that was really interesting that I 525 00:20:22,669 --> 00:20:20,880 wouldn't have been able to break it down 526 00:20:25,250 --> 00:20:22,679 like that so I find it 527 00:20:26,870 --> 00:20:25,260 intriguing in the least so anything on 528 00:20:28,850 --> 00:20:26,880 this page and obviously we've got the 529 00:20:30,409 --> 00:20:28,860 the numbers here and I think like we 530 00:20:32,810 --> 00:20:30,419 already mentioned it was interesting to 531 00:20:34,370 --> 00:20:32,820 see these higher numbers it was good and 532 00:20:36,230 --> 00:20:34,380 Chris this was something that was 533 00:20:39,770 --> 00:20:36,240 reported on by yourself and Josh back in 534 00:20:41,150 --> 00:20:39,780 October and the numbers turned out to be 535 00:20:43,669 --> 00:20:41,160 pretty much the same as what you 536 00:20:45,409 --> 00:20:43,679 reported on like back then which then 537 00:20:47,690 --> 00:20:45,419 makes me think that other things that 538 00:20:50,150 --> 00:20:47,700 were featured in that story may also 539 00:20:51,770 --> 00:20:50,160 hold a lot of weight such as you know 540 00:20:53,270 --> 00:20:51,780 there was that one incident in the 541 00:20:55,010 --> 00:20:53,280 Middle East with the reaper drones and 542 00:20:56,570 --> 00:20:55,020 the orbs and that that part we you know 543 00:20:59,390 --> 00:20:56,580 there was nothing like that featured in 544 00:21:01,070 --> 00:20:59,400 this report so that to me then puts a 545 00:21:03,010 --> 00:21:01,080 lot of weight on that particular case 546 00:21:05,750 --> 00:21:03,020 for example that these things are being 547 00:21:07,610 --> 00:21:05,760 reported and picked up so how you know 548 00:21:09,409 --> 00:21:07,620 do you want to speak to that 549 00:21:10,970 --> 00:21:09,419 absolutely I mean I can't take her in 550 00:21:13,190 --> 00:21:10,980 for that Josh just got all that that 551 00:21:15,230 --> 00:21:13,200 really surprised me because we're trying 552 00:21:17,450 --> 00:21:15,240 to find sources basically to tell us 553 00:21:20,090 --> 00:21:17,460 stuff and give us the inside story I 554 00:21:21,770 --> 00:21:20,100 didn't hear from Joshua and it just came 555 00:21:22,990 --> 00:21:21,780 from nowhere I was like bloody how would 556 00:21:26,390 --> 00:21:23,000 that come from 557 00:21:29,029 --> 00:21:26,400 anyone to get like an odni Source like 558 00:21:30,950 --> 00:21:29,039 that to speak out but I think it was in 559 00:21:33,409 --> 00:21:30,960 answer to 560 00:21:34,789 --> 00:21:33,419 um barnes's article basically and I 561 00:21:36,230 --> 00:21:34,799 think the source themselves said look 562 00:21:39,649 --> 00:21:36,240 they're trying to cross things over here 563 00:21:42,470 --> 00:21:39,659 and the source said you know there's a s 564 00:21:44,330 --> 00:21:42,480 hit loads of classified videos that are 565 00:21:45,529 --> 00:21:44,340 pretty profound pretty clear they don't 566 00:21:47,570 --> 00:21:45,539 want to talk about this stuff because 567 00:21:50,510 --> 00:21:47,580 they really really don't know what the 568 00:21:52,130 --> 00:21:50,520 hell they are and that's the truth uh 569 00:21:54,649 --> 00:21:52,140 and you've got things like he explains 570 00:21:57,710 --> 00:21:54,659 here you know that um object diving into 571 00:21:59,750 --> 00:21:57,720 the ocean without making a splash 572 00:22:02,090 --> 00:21:59,760 um and that's really interesting because 573 00:22:03,950 --> 00:22:02,100 if that's true and we've seen the 574 00:22:05,570 --> 00:22:03,960 Corbell video of that thing going under 575 00:22:08,330 --> 00:22:05,580 the water 576 00:22:09,770 --> 00:22:08,340 without apparent stash although the crew 577 00:22:11,630 --> 00:22:09,780 does say it because that's a term 578 00:22:14,330 --> 00:22:11,640 knowledge for you but he's got a baby 579 00:22:17,390 --> 00:22:14,340 saying it's going underwater but that 580 00:22:19,070 --> 00:22:17,400 contradicts what Moultrie said at the 581 00:22:21,289 --> 00:22:19,080 media round table because he basically 582 00:22:22,850 --> 00:22:21,299 said that we hadn't seen any trans 583 00:22:28,549 --> 00:22:22,860 medium 584 00:22:30,590 --> 00:22:28,559 um well any credible reporting anyhow so 585 00:22:32,810 --> 00:22:30,600 I mean there's all these qualifiers you 586 00:22:36,230 --> 00:22:32,820 know that they're using an incredible 587 00:22:37,490 --> 00:22:36,240 reporting not any reporting so yeah I 588 00:22:39,529 --> 00:22:37,500 mean they've got to be really careful 589 00:22:41,750 --> 00:22:39,539 now these people do because you know the 590 00:22:43,970 --> 00:22:41,760 new ndaa does make it clear that they're 591 00:22:46,970 --> 00:22:43,980 going to be looking at all the times 592 00:22:48,590 --> 00:22:46,980 when government officials have misled 593 00:22:51,049 --> 00:22:48,600 um the public when it comes to this 594 00:22:52,789 --> 00:22:51,059 topic so um I would count that as kind 595 00:22:54,770 --> 00:22:52,799 of misleading because even though 596 00:22:56,810 --> 00:22:54,780 they're careful with their statements 597 00:22:59,149 --> 00:22:56,820 the media just tends to run with them 598 00:23:00,710 --> 00:22:59,159 without looking at the nuances and the 599 00:23:02,810 --> 00:23:00,720 same goes to this report as well which 600 00:23:04,310 --> 00:23:02,820 we'll get on to later 601 00:23:05,870 --> 00:23:04,320 I think that you brought up a really 602 00:23:07,610 --> 00:23:05,880 good point Chris and this is something I 603 00:23:09,409 --> 00:23:07,620 was on a foreign policy podcast a couple 604 00:23:12,289 --> 00:23:09,419 days ago and that was something I 605 00:23:14,690 --> 00:23:12,299 brought up is that I think a lot of the 606 00:23:16,669 --> 00:23:14,700 media the journalists who should know 607 00:23:19,549 --> 00:23:16,679 better who should be digging in piece by 608 00:23:21,649 --> 00:23:19,559 piece in these reports they do they zero 609 00:23:23,990 --> 00:23:21,659 in on those little comments and they 610 00:23:25,850 --> 00:23:24,000 don't look at what actually is backing 611 00:23:28,190 --> 00:23:25,860 it up because a lot of times it's very 612 00:23:31,490 --> 00:23:28,200 very different or you know people who 613 00:23:33,890 --> 00:23:31,500 are capable of reporting on very nuanced 614 00:23:36,770 --> 00:23:33,900 public policy for some reason are 615 00:23:40,310 --> 00:23:36,780 incapable of reporting on Nuance in this 616 00:23:43,190 --> 00:23:40,320 topic and that's why you know I I I said 617 00:23:46,370 --> 00:23:43,200 earlier this week print out the report 618 00:23:50,210 --> 00:23:46,380 read it yourself go line by line because 619 00:23:52,610 --> 00:23:50,220 oftentimes a single word is important 620 00:23:54,710 --> 00:23:52,620 um in the overall view of it 621 00:23:56,750 --> 00:23:54,720 yeah I completely agree and a lot of 622 00:23:57,950 --> 00:23:56,760 people were instantly saying well it's a 623 00:24:00,890 --> 00:23:57,960 nothing Burger there's no decent 624 00:24:02,210 --> 00:24:00,900 information and I totally disagree and 625 00:24:04,190 --> 00:24:02,220 then people would say yeah but you're 626 00:24:05,930 --> 00:24:04,200 just clutching at straws you know you're 627 00:24:08,330 --> 00:24:05,940 naive to think that there's anything in 628 00:24:10,549 --> 00:24:08,340 here and again I disagree it's very 629 00:24:12,649 --> 00:24:10,559 difficult isn't it when 630 00:24:14,690 --> 00:24:12,659 you know lack of information is also 631 00:24:16,190 --> 00:24:14,700 information 632 00:24:17,870 --> 00:24:16,200 I mean it just points there's certain 633 00:24:20,210 --> 00:24:17,880 things that you 634 00:24:22,549 --> 00:24:20,220 going forward you know yeah this isn't a 635 00:24:23,810 --> 00:24:22,559 bombshell and it never was gonna be you 636 00:24:25,730 --> 00:24:23,820 know this is clearly laying out 637 00:24:27,950 --> 00:24:25,740 procedures and and things like that 638 00:24:30,169 --> 00:24:27,960 moving forward for Arrow and the scope 639 00:24:31,370 --> 00:24:30,179 of what they're going to do and and I 640 00:24:33,169 --> 00:24:31,380 found that great 641 00:24:34,370 --> 00:24:33,179 um and just talking about Chris you 642 00:24:36,169 --> 00:24:34,380 mentioned there that there were 643 00:24:38,270 --> 00:24:36,179 obviously videos and things that were 644 00:24:40,250 --> 00:24:38,280 analyzed and looked at and we see the 645 00:24:42,110 --> 00:24:40,260 lines saying that some UAP appear to 646 00:24:43,789 --> 00:24:42,120 have demonstrated unusual flight 647 00:24:46,010 --> 00:24:43,799 characteristics or performance 648 00:24:48,169 --> 00:24:46,020 capabilities and require further 649 00:24:49,850 --> 00:24:48,179 analysis I mean that's a big line for me 650 00:24:52,250 --> 00:24:49,860 personally because it shows that they 651 00:24:54,770 --> 00:24:52,260 are looking at something bizarre 652 00:24:58,010 --> 00:24:54,780 that is the key that is the key line to 653 00:25:00,529 --> 00:24:58,020 me and they they don't they they don't 654 00:25:02,450 --> 00:25:00,539 expand upon that at least the 655 00:25:05,450 --> 00:25:02,460 preliminary report that was released in 656 00:25:07,549 --> 00:25:05,460 2021 they did talk about some of these 657 00:25:09,529 --> 00:25:07,559 capabilities 658 00:25:11,630 --> 00:25:09,539 um but they don't they don't do it in 659 00:25:13,490 --> 00:25:11,640 this one so they're trying to close the 660 00:25:15,590 --> 00:25:13,500 shop when it comes to expanding more on 661 00:25:19,250 --> 00:25:15,600 this which is why I found some of the 662 00:25:21,710 --> 00:25:19,260 things that occurred recently with John 663 00:25:23,510 --> 00:25:21,720 Radcliffe basically saying look this is 664 00:25:25,610 --> 00:25:23,520 like against the law of physics the 665 00:25:27,470 --> 00:25:25,620 things that these things are these 666 00:25:28,549 --> 00:25:27,480 objects are doing so 667 00:25:31,430 --> 00:25:28,559 um I think there's gonna be major 668 00:25:33,950 --> 00:25:31,440 pushback by them trying to control this 669 00:25:36,409 --> 00:25:33,960 narrative and trying to gloss over as 670 00:25:37,850 --> 00:25:36,419 that odnisource said some of the insane 671 00:25:40,010 --> 00:25:37,860 things that they've actually been able 672 00:25:41,750 --> 00:25:40,020 to capture so that that's really really 673 00:25:44,269 --> 00:25:41,760 important and that is the one thing I 674 00:25:46,250 --> 00:25:44,279 tried to push on when I actually spoke 675 00:25:48,470 --> 00:25:46,260 to Kirkpatrick and Moultrie and they 676 00:25:51,169 --> 00:25:48,480 need to be more they need to be more 677 00:25:52,190 --> 00:25:51,179 open about this I think frankly do you 678 00:25:54,590 --> 00:25:52,200 think that they can do that without 679 00:25:58,490 --> 00:25:54,600 divulging sources and methods though 680 00:26:01,310 --> 00:25:58,500 yeah I think they can look they 681 00:26:03,409 --> 00:26:01,320 they've recently 682 00:26:05,870 --> 00:26:03,419 I mean you look you look time I mean 683 00:26:07,549 --> 00:26:05,880 whether it's the mod where it's the U.S 684 00:26:09,289 --> 00:26:07,559 military they'll release videos when 685 00:26:10,789 --> 00:26:09,299 they want when they want to 686 00:26:12,169 --> 00:26:10,799 send out message about Russian 687 00:26:14,690 --> 00:26:12,179 aggression 688 00:26:17,890 --> 00:26:14,700 um showing you know Russian Jets talking 689 00:26:21,769 --> 00:26:17,900 their own aircraft and other adverse 690 00:26:25,850 --> 00:26:21,779 adversary actions taken when it suits 691 00:26:27,529 --> 00:26:25,860 them you know and and recently as well 692 00:26:29,149 --> 00:26:27,539 with the Ukraine situation they've been 693 00:26:30,950 --> 00:26:29,159 a lot more open in terms of what they 694 00:26:33,470 --> 00:26:30,960 can share publicly in terms of their 695 00:26:36,289 --> 00:26:33,480 intelligence so they can go that little 696 00:26:39,649 --> 00:26:36,299 bit further if they if they want to but 697 00:26:41,570 --> 00:26:39,659 for some reason they're not and I think 698 00:26:43,730 --> 00:26:41,580 that's going to cause problems going 699 00:26:44,990 --> 00:26:43,740 forward and people aren't going to trust 700 00:26:46,610 --> 00:26:45,000 them because there is a lack of 701 00:26:48,890 --> 00:26:46,620 transparency 702 00:26:51,529 --> 00:26:48,900 um regarding this process and it's it's 703 00:26:52,310 --> 00:26:51,539 not good and the key question is you 704 00:26:55,310 --> 00:26:52,320 know 705 00:26:56,930 --> 00:26:55,320 um what is this you unusual 706 00:26:58,789 --> 00:26:56,940 what are these unusual flight 707 00:27:02,870 --> 00:26:58,799 characteristics performance capabilities 708 00:27:05,990 --> 00:27:02,880 and do you believe that any foreign 709 00:27:09,769 --> 00:27:06,000 Nations or adversaries are capable of 710 00:27:11,149 --> 00:27:09,779 this capability or technology that's the 711 00:27:12,890 --> 00:27:11,159 key question 712 00:27:15,590 --> 00:27:12,900 well and I I think it's important to 713 00:27:17,870 --> 00:27:15,600 remember two things on this one is that 714 00:27:19,850 --> 00:27:17,880 the US government is never going to 715 00:27:22,130 --> 00:27:19,860 share information just for the heck of 716 00:27:23,330 --> 00:27:22,140 it you know what I mean it's they're 717 00:27:25,730 --> 00:27:23,340 going to share information when there's 718 00:27:27,409 --> 00:27:25,740 a strategic advantage to do so so for 719 00:27:29,510 --> 00:27:27,419 example one of the things I saw in here 720 00:27:31,930 --> 00:27:29,520 was actually no I'm sorry this was in 721 00:27:34,970 --> 00:27:31,940 the Kirkpatrick slides concern over 722 00:27:38,269 --> 00:27:34,980 whether or not our our allies or 723 00:27:40,549 --> 00:27:38,279 adversaries might misattribute a UAP to 724 00:27:43,610 --> 00:27:40,559 U.S tech which could be very provocative 725 00:27:45,769 --> 00:27:43,620 right and so I think there we need to 726 00:27:47,990 --> 00:27:45,779 realize that there may be times when we 727 00:27:50,750 --> 00:27:48,000 share information not because we care 728 00:27:52,909 --> 00:27:50,760 about disclosure but because we want to 729 00:27:54,710 --> 00:27:52,919 make something very clear that hey we 730 00:27:57,110 --> 00:27:54,720 weren't buzzing your nuclear facilities 731 00:27:58,850 --> 00:27:57,120 you know like like don't don't go to war 732 00:28:02,149 --> 00:27:58,860 with us about this 733 00:28:03,950 --> 00:28:02,159 um so that's number one and number two 734 00:28:05,870 --> 00:28:03,960 is something that I completely forgot 735 00:28:07,490 --> 00:28:05,880 and it just left my room don't worry 736 00:28:09,470 --> 00:28:07,500 chime in if it comes back into effect 737 00:28:11,149 --> 00:28:09,480 don't worry don't worry 738 00:28:12,169 --> 00:28:11,159 I suppose the other thing that jumped 739 00:28:13,490 --> 00:28:12,179 out to me on here was that they're 740 00:28:15,409 --> 00:28:13,500 saying that the majority of the new 741 00:28:16,730 --> 00:28:15,419 cases came from the both the Air Force 742 00:28:19,250 --> 00:28:16,740 and the Navy and then obviously in the 743 00:28:20,930 --> 00:28:19,260 preliminary preliminary assessment there 744 00:28:22,730 --> 00:28:20,940 was a certain lack of the Air Force 745 00:28:24,529 --> 00:28:22,740 involvement so you know I think we've 746 00:28:26,630 --> 00:28:24,539 been crying out for that but I I'm not 747 00:28:28,310 --> 00:28:26,640 convinced 100 that it's just all of a 748 00:28:32,090 --> 00:28:28,320 sudden they're just talking and 749 00:28:35,149 --> 00:28:32,100 collaborating any thoughts on that 750 00:28:37,549 --> 00:28:35,159 I want to know where space force is true 751 00:28:40,370 --> 00:28:37,559 that's a great question yeah good point 752 00:28:44,149 --> 00:28:41,750 thought worse 753 00:28:46,970 --> 00:28:44,159 um yeah I highly doubt that suddenly 754 00:28:49,970 --> 00:28:46,980 after 70 years they're just perfectly 755 00:28:51,350 --> 00:28:49,980 um compliant uh but yeah we're missing a 756 00:28:53,570 --> 00:28:51,360 couple branches there 757 00:28:55,310 --> 00:28:53,580 I'd maybe maybe Marines have seen 758 00:28:56,510 --> 00:28:55,320 something I don't know um but I would 759 00:29:00,049 --> 00:28:56,520 like to 760 00:29:02,210 --> 00:29:00,059 space force especially considering there 761 00:29:04,850 --> 00:29:02,220 might be some very intelligent people 762 00:29:07,370 --> 00:29:04,860 working for space force on this topic so 763 00:29:09,890 --> 00:29:07,380 I'm very curious about that 764 00:29:11,029 --> 00:29:09,900 yeah absolutely Chris any thoughts on 765 00:29:13,490 --> 00:29:11,039 the Air Force 766 00:29:16,549 --> 00:29:13,500 so on space wars firstly yeah multiple 767 00:29:18,289 --> 00:29:16,559 people told me that space force are 768 00:29:20,990 --> 00:29:18,299 studying this and this is why Louis 769 00:29:22,970 --> 00:29:21,000 zande was was working there as well for 770 00:29:24,649 --> 00:29:22,980 my understanding that there is an 771 00:29:25,909 --> 00:29:24,659 ongoing effort with space force so I 772 00:29:28,970 --> 00:29:25,919 just don't know when they're going to 773 00:29:31,549 --> 00:29:28,980 publicly acknowledge that 774 00:29:34,370 --> 00:29:31,559 um but we'll we'll have to see 775 00:29:37,610 --> 00:29:34,380 um in terms of U.S Air Force yeah so it 776 00:29:39,889 --> 00:29:37,620 confirmed to me that it did not extend 777 00:29:42,889 --> 00:29:39,899 its pilot program 778 00:29:45,830 --> 00:29:42,899 um to look into UAP hotspot like I think 779 00:29:49,310 --> 00:29:45,840 it was a particular UAP hotspot so 780 00:29:51,110 --> 00:29:49,320 um that was interesting so I I don't 781 00:29:52,610 --> 00:29:51,120 understand where the Air Force is at at 782 00:29:54,830 --> 00:29:52,620 the moment currently 783 00:29:56,810 --> 00:29:54,840 um in terms of this because 784 00:29:59,149 --> 00:29:56,820 I don't know if my understanding the 785 00:30:00,950 --> 00:29:59,159 stigma is still attached to the topic of 786 00:30:03,590 --> 00:30:00,960 in the Air Force so I don't know how 787 00:30:06,470 --> 00:30:03,600 many new cases are going to get reported 788 00:30:09,529 --> 00:30:06,480 um as compared with the U.S naval Navy 789 00:30:12,830 --> 00:30:09,539 which is doing more to help erase the 790 00:30:15,350 --> 00:30:12,840 stigma so I I mean it is definitely an 791 00:30:16,730 --> 00:30:15,360 interesting situation but from my 792 00:30:19,850 --> 00:30:16,740 understanding 793 00:30:21,830 --> 00:30:19,860 um one uaptf is getting started it 794 00:30:25,130 --> 00:30:21,840 looked like the 795 00:30:27,710 --> 00:30:25,140 um US Air Force was going to start 796 00:30:29,690 --> 00:30:27,720 um cooperating with them and working 797 00:30:31,730 --> 00:30:29,700 together with them but then all of a 798 00:30:33,250 --> 00:30:31,740 sudden they just did a complete U-turn 799 00:30:35,630 --> 00:30:33,260 and 800 00:30:38,029 --> 00:30:35,640 umap topic again 801 00:30:39,289 --> 00:30:38,039 yeah yeah absolutely 802 00:30:40,549 --> 00:30:39,299 um now just this last bit at the bottom 803 00:30:42,409 --> 00:30:40,559 of the page this partnership's in 804 00:30:44,510 --> 00:30:42,419 collaboration it was good to see the FAA 805 00:30:45,889 --> 00:30:44,520 and NASA mentioned but I found it 806 00:30:48,769 --> 00:30:45,899 interesting where they said that Aria is 807 00:30:50,810 --> 00:30:48,779 working closely with OSD PA and Mission 808 00:30:52,730 --> 00:30:50,820 Partners to develop information sharing 809 00:30:56,450 --> 00:30:52,740 and messaging strategy that aims to 810 00:30:59,029 --> 00:30:56,460 maximize transparency I mean okay if you 811 00:31:00,769 --> 00:30:59,039 say so while maintaining appropriate 812 00:31:02,930 --> 00:31:00,779 protections of sensitive sources and 813 00:31:05,330 --> 00:31:02,940 methods okay that I did like to see that 814 00:31:07,250 --> 00:31:05,340 word transparency in there but but at 815 00:31:09,049 --> 00:31:07,260 least give us something with it it's 816 00:31:11,990 --> 00:31:09,059 easy to type that in a report yeah 817 00:31:14,690 --> 00:31:12,000 exactly I I I'm sorry I called 818 00:31:17,269 --> 00:31:14,700 it's the the public affairs office their 819 00:31:20,389 --> 00:31:17,279 goal isn't to be transparent their goal 820 00:31:23,389 --> 00:31:20,399 is to manage the message uh so I think 821 00:31:25,490 --> 00:31:23,399 that's just a cut and paste uh 822 00:31:27,590 --> 00:31:25,500 communication strategy thing that you 823 00:31:29,630 --> 00:31:27,600 could probably find in many DOD reports 824 00:31:32,870 --> 00:31:29,640 cool good to hear that from you yeah 825 00:31:35,750 --> 00:31:32,880 that makes sense I suppose and then page 826 00:31:37,370 --> 00:31:35,760 six uh they mentioned the first time 827 00:31:39,830 --> 00:31:37,380 here about communication with Allied 828 00:31:41,690 --> 00:31:39,840 Partners regarding UAP now we've not 829 00:31:44,330 --> 00:31:41,700 really heard that much we did hear a bit 830 00:31:46,190 --> 00:31:44,340 out of Canada towards kind of well last 831 00:31:48,289 --> 00:31:46,200 year there was a few conversations we 832 00:31:49,430 --> 00:31:48,299 know that had and I think am I writing 833 00:31:51,889 --> 00:31:49,440 saying that 834 00:31:53,510 --> 00:31:51,899 there were briefings held between I 835 00:31:55,610 --> 00:31:53,520 don't think it was Kirkpatrick it might 836 00:31:57,769 --> 00:31:55,620 have been someone before him do you know 837 00:31:59,630 --> 00:31:57,779 about that Chris at all can you confirm 838 00:32:02,810 --> 00:31:59,640 that and I'm sure there was a briefing 839 00:32:05,570 --> 00:32:02,820 between whoever was running the UFO 840 00:32:07,610 --> 00:32:05,580 sorry the UAP office last year it might 841 00:32:09,049 --> 00:32:07,620 have been aim SOG I'm not sure 842 00:32:12,769 --> 00:32:09,059 Chris do you know anything about that 843 00:32:15,289 --> 00:32:12,779 yeah from my understanding it was um 844 00:32:17,510 --> 00:32:15,299 uh yeah it was reported that there had 845 00:32:20,029 --> 00:32:17,520 been a briefly briefing 846 00:32:23,750 --> 00:32:20,039 um that took place with Canada's 847 00:32:28,310 --> 00:32:23,760 um mod on the topic from understanding 848 00:32:29,630 --> 00:32:28,320 and that was confirmed by Susan Goff as 849 00:32:31,669 --> 00:32:29,640 well 850 00:32:34,490 --> 00:32:31,679 um so so that has taken place I mean 851 00:32:37,610 --> 00:32:34,500 this is a really really vital question 852 00:32:40,850 --> 00:32:37,620 in terms of what topic let's say in 853 00:32:43,909 --> 00:32:40,860 terms of collaborating with allies and 854 00:32:45,409 --> 00:32:43,919 partners is so vital because I mean just 855 00:32:49,130 --> 00:32:45,419 keep that port in your head but let's 856 00:32:52,310 --> 00:32:49,140 just say there's so many theaters within 857 00:32:54,769 --> 00:32:52,320 the past 20 years that the US and its 858 00:32:57,789 --> 00:32:54,779 partners and allies have been operating 859 00:33:00,889 --> 00:32:57,799 joint kind of like um 860 00:33:03,350 --> 00:33:00,899 joint operations let's say and then LBC 861 00:33:05,269 --> 00:33:03,360 we had the Firebase Alliance as well 862 00:33:07,850 --> 00:33:05,279 where information about to say that 863 00:33:09,350 --> 00:33:07,860 mm-hmm yeah I would expect I would 864 00:33:11,810 --> 00:33:09,360 expect that it would be five eyes 865 00:33:13,669 --> 00:33:11,820 exclusively at this point 866 00:33:15,649 --> 00:33:13,679 um at least formally speaking I'm sure 867 00:33:16,610 --> 00:33:15,659 there are small side conversations that 868 00:33:17,810 --> 00:33:16,620 happen 869 00:33:19,490 --> 00:33:17,820 um but and for those of you who aren't 870 00:33:20,930 --> 00:33:19,500 familiar with five eyes it's basically 871 00:33:23,930 --> 00:33:20,940 the closest 872 00:33:25,909 --> 00:33:23,940 um uh information and intelligence 873 00:33:28,549 --> 00:33:25,919 sharing agreement we have it it's it's 874 00:33:31,430 --> 00:33:28,559 for the five basically majority 875 00:33:34,310 --> 00:33:31,440 English-speaking countries the US UK 876 00:33:36,049 --> 00:33:34,320 Canada New Zealand Australia I'm not 877 00:33:37,430 --> 00:33:36,059 missing yeah it's fine that's it yeah I 878 00:33:38,930 --> 00:33:37,440 know that's it 879 00:33:40,310 --> 00:33:38,940 um so that's what you would expect is 880 00:33:42,169 --> 00:33:40,320 that most of the intelligence will be 881 00:33:44,090 --> 00:33:42,179 shared with those countries that we have 882 00:33:46,190 --> 00:33:44,100 our closest relationship with in terms 883 00:33:48,289 --> 00:33:46,200 of intelligence yeah and when you know 884 00:33:49,610 --> 00:33:48,299 after we we mentioned Canada but then 885 00:33:50,990 --> 00:33:49,620 you know you look to the UK and there's 886 00:33:53,630 --> 00:33:51,000 no conversation Happening Here 887 00:33:55,850 --> 00:33:53,640 whatsoever New Zealand again very quiet 888 00:33:58,009 --> 00:33:55,860 I mean in Australia it's been good to 889 00:34:00,590 --> 00:33:58,019 see Senator Peter wish Wilson kind of 890 00:34:02,870 --> 00:34:00,600 pushing uh the conversation out there 891 00:34:04,549 --> 00:34:02,880 he's not got a lot out of them but it's 892 00:34:06,470 --> 00:34:04,559 good to see someone in 893 00:34:07,909 --> 00:34:06,480 um you know with his authority trying to 894 00:34:10,310 --> 00:34:07,919 have the conversation and I think we 895 00:34:12,349 --> 00:34:10,320 need that more here in the UK about 896 00:34:14,510 --> 00:34:12,359 everywhere but you know at least they've 897 00:34:17,389 --> 00:34:14,520 got something someone doing positive 898 00:34:19,730 --> 00:34:17,399 stuff in Australia so yeah that's 899 00:34:21,169 --> 00:34:19,740 interesting uh then finally I'm here 900 00:34:22,849 --> 00:34:21,179 we're talking about the flight safety 901 00:34:24,950 --> 00:34:22,859 concern turns which I think are obvious 902 00:34:27,230 --> 00:34:24,960 to anybody who's been following this 903 00:34:28,849 --> 00:34:27,240 subject now and and heard of the work 904 00:34:31,849 --> 00:34:28,859 that Ryan Graves has been doing on that 905 00:34:34,909 --> 00:34:31,859 that aspect of uh UAP but then this bit 906 00:34:36,530 --> 00:34:34,919 at the bottom where you know there have 907 00:34:38,570 --> 00:34:36,540 been no encounters confirmed to 908 00:34:40,909 --> 00:34:38,580 contribute directly to adverse health 909 00:34:42,829 --> 00:34:40,919 related effects 910 00:34:45,470 --> 00:34:42,839 um which okay I mean a lot of these 911 00:34:49,730 --> 00:34:45,480 cases were just from the year but I mean 912 00:34:56,149 --> 00:34:53,530 yeah Chris I'll let you go first 913 00:34:58,510 --> 00:34:56,159 yeah yeah so the key word being here 914 00:35:01,070 --> 00:34:58,520 enough qualifier direct 915 00:35:06,890 --> 00:35:01,080 and confirmed 916 00:35:08,510 --> 00:35:06,900 um it's yeah it's very very it's meant 917 00:35:10,670 --> 00:35:08,520 to be like that it's it's phrased like 918 00:35:12,589 --> 00:35:10,680 that for a good reason but I mean I 919 00:35:14,030 --> 00:35:12,599 think Lila zondo 920 00:35:16,609 --> 00:35:14,040 um suggested that 921 00:35:18,230 --> 00:35:16,619 Health implications where that 922 00:35:20,630 --> 00:35:18,240 um Pilots were aviated they were 923 00:35:22,730 --> 00:35:20,640 aviators would be up in the sky 924 00:35:26,470 --> 00:35:22,740 um there would be 925 00:35:29,450 --> 00:35:26,480 lost time events so where 926 00:35:30,950 --> 00:35:29,460 they would um they would like lose a 927 00:35:32,990 --> 00:35:30,960 minute or something in the sky and they 928 00:35:35,990 --> 00:35:33,000 wouldn't know where that time went 929 00:35:38,569 --> 00:35:36,000 um and it would be because I think it 930 00:35:41,990 --> 00:35:38,579 would be like okay I burn 931 00:35:43,430 --> 00:35:42,000 through no it's one minute forward but I 932 00:35:44,690 --> 00:35:43,440 burnt I haven't burnt through that much 933 00:35:47,510 --> 00:35:44,700 fuel or something like that some 934 00:35:50,030 --> 00:35:47,520 discrepancy between the time and the 935 00:35:52,310 --> 00:35:50,040 fuel that they had been and that led 936 00:35:53,990 --> 00:35:52,320 some they were aviators to believe that 937 00:35:55,250 --> 00:35:54,000 they had lost track of time and then 938 00:36:00,890 --> 00:35:55,260 there was 939 00:36:03,170 --> 00:36:00,900 as well that was reported by some Navy 940 00:36:05,450 --> 00:36:03,180 Naval aviators 941 00:36:10,370 --> 00:36:05,460 um which I think related to 942 00:36:12,230 --> 00:36:10,380 um to to incidents involving UAP 943 00:36:15,589 --> 00:36:12,240 um and possible microwave damage as well 944 00:36:16,670 --> 00:36:15,599 so I think those would be the things 945 00:36:20,569 --> 00:36:16,680 um I could 946 00:36:22,790 --> 00:36:20,579 be Health implications from UAP 947 00:36:25,370 --> 00:36:22,800 um yeah it's very interestingly word it 948 00:36:26,810 --> 00:36:25,380 definitely it's it's something to look 949 00:36:28,730 --> 00:36:26,820 out for in the future and I'm hoping 950 00:36:31,010 --> 00:36:28,740 that as more progress has been is being 951 00:36:33,410 --> 00:36:31,020 made on this topic and arrow gets its 952 00:36:36,050 --> 00:36:33,420 act together that we can get some more 953 00:36:38,450 --> 00:36:36,060 definitive conclusions on this 954 00:36:40,550 --> 00:36:38,460 absolutely and you know I I think those 955 00:36:41,329 --> 00:36:40,560 two words are what stuck out to me as 956 00:36:43,010 --> 00:36:41,339 well 957 00:36:46,130 --> 00:36:43,020 um putting my epidemiologist hat on 958 00:36:48,730 --> 00:36:46,140 though I also it was a little irritated 959 00:36:52,030 --> 00:36:48,740 because what we really need is we need 960 00:36:54,410 --> 00:36:52,040 epidemiologists to study this for 961 00:36:57,349 --> 00:36:54,420 decades because what we see a lot of 962 00:37:00,109 --> 00:36:57,359 times as the type of exposures that uh 963 00:37:01,670 --> 00:37:00,119 UAP experiencers have are typically in 964 00:37:02,930 --> 00:37:01,680 the radiation 965 00:37:06,650 --> 00:37:02,940 um 966 00:37:09,849 --> 00:37:06,660 symptomology and we know for a fact well 967 00:37:12,890 --> 00:37:09,859 we know based on anecdotes that 968 00:37:15,109 --> 00:37:12,900 experiencers have high amounts of 969 00:37:17,150 --> 00:37:15,119 autoimmune and cancer clustering these 970 00:37:19,910 --> 00:37:17,160 are changes that happen over years 971 00:37:22,490 --> 00:37:19,920 decades even and so I think what we need 972 00:37:25,130 --> 00:37:22,500 to do is really make sure that for folks 973 00:37:27,530 --> 00:37:25,140 who are having these encounters we're 974 00:37:29,810 --> 00:37:27,540 following their records 975 00:37:32,089 --> 00:37:29,820 um for a while and that's not a cheap 976 00:37:34,190 --> 00:37:32,099 thing to do and it probably won't happen 977 00:37:35,690 --> 00:37:34,200 but if we're really serious about 978 00:37:37,910 --> 00:37:35,700 looking into this that's what we would 979 00:37:40,310 --> 00:37:37,920 look at because it's just impossible to 980 00:37:41,990 --> 00:37:40,320 say at the exact time whether or not 981 00:37:44,510 --> 00:37:42,000 there was any impact to human health 982 00:37:46,250 --> 00:37:44,520 there's a lot of cellular changes that 983 00:37:48,829 --> 00:37:46,260 could happen that we're not going to see 984 00:37:51,050 --> 00:37:48,839 immediately it's really important as 985 00:37:52,310 --> 00:37:51,060 well for Pilots near wavy eaters and 986 00:37:54,829 --> 00:37:52,320 their families to understand what 987 00:37:58,130 --> 00:37:54,839 they're getting into when they sign up 988 00:38:00,470 --> 00:37:58,140 to to serve their country I I feel 989 00:38:01,910 --> 00:38:00,480 um you know you look back on decades ago 990 00:38:03,290 --> 00:38:01,920 when the nuclear tests were being 991 00:38:06,530 --> 00:38:03,300 carried out and 992 00:38:08,990 --> 00:38:06,540 now you've got lots of um people who 993 00:38:11,750 --> 00:38:09,000 took part in those tests and they've got 994 00:38:14,150 --> 00:38:11,760 horrible diseases from it 995 00:38:16,430 --> 00:38:14,160 um and at the time the risks weren't 996 00:38:18,470 --> 00:38:16,440 made clear and that seen as a scandal 997 00:38:20,210 --> 00:38:18,480 and I think that we could potentially 998 00:38:22,550 --> 00:38:20,220 see something similar if it is found 999 00:38:24,710 --> 00:38:22,560 conclusive that there are health related 1000 00:38:26,870 --> 00:38:24,720 impacts from UAP 1001 00:38:28,970 --> 00:38:26,880 yeah absolutely I appreciate you both 1002 00:38:29,930 --> 00:38:28,980 talking about that I mean we only have 1003 00:38:31,910 --> 00:38:29,940 to look at what happened with John 1004 00:38:34,130 --> 00:38:31,920 Burris following rendersham the amount 1005 00:38:36,109 --> 00:38:34,140 of years and decades he had trying to 1006 00:38:38,150 --> 00:38:36,119 get his medical records and some kind of 1007 00:38:39,349 --> 00:38:38,160 reimbursement through you know as a 1008 00:38:41,030 --> 00:38:39,359 veteran so 1009 00:38:43,010 --> 00:38:41,040 yeah it'd be interesting to see how that 1010 00:38:46,250 --> 00:38:43,020 develops in any more future reports and 1011 00:38:48,470 --> 00:38:46,260 the work that Arrow are doing so yeah so 1012 00:38:50,089 --> 00:38:48,480 moving on to the summary here I mean the 1013 00:38:52,490 --> 00:38:50,099 first line stating about the hazard to 1014 00:38:54,589 --> 00:38:52,500 flight safety I like how they put a pose 1015 00:38:56,630 --> 00:38:54,599 pose a possible adversary collection 1016 00:38:58,010 --> 00:38:56,640 threat because people still see that 1017 00:38:59,210 --> 00:38:58,020 word threat and they still don't 1018 00:39:01,550 --> 00:38:59,220 understand that we're not talking about 1019 00:39:05,210 --> 00:39:01,560 an alien invasion here we're still 1020 00:39:08,569 --> 00:39:05,220 talking about defense and the Department 1021 00:39:10,430 --> 00:39:08,579 of Defense doing their job by you know 1022 00:39:12,470 --> 00:39:10,440 you can't just assume that these things 1023 00:39:14,569 --> 00:39:12,480 they're not a threat we're the threat to 1024 00:39:16,510 --> 00:39:14,579 humanity you know we've got to get past 1025 00:39:19,550 --> 00:39:16,520 that so that's good to see that it was 1026 00:39:21,109 --> 00:39:19,560 defined a bit better 1027 00:39:22,849 --> 00:39:21,119 um but they're saying as well that you 1028 00:39:25,390 --> 00:39:22,859 know the reporting is due to the dis 1029 00:39:28,550 --> 00:39:25,400 because the efforts trying to destigmat 1030 00:39:30,230 --> 00:39:28,560 stigmatize the topic okay that's good to 1031 00:39:30,950 --> 00:39:30,240 hear as well 1032 00:39:33,170 --> 00:39:30,960 um 1033 00:39:34,550 --> 00:39:33,180 yeah if any of you guys can pull 1034 00:39:37,550 --> 00:39:34,560 anything out of there that you think is 1035 00:39:40,190 --> 00:39:37,560 worth mentioning uh I see at the bottom 1036 00:39:41,990 --> 00:39:40,200 the coordinated coordinated efforts it 1037 00:39:45,050 --> 00:39:42,000 does from the the wording in the last 1038 00:39:47,870 --> 00:39:45,060 paragraph sound like they're starting to 1039 00:39:49,730 --> 00:39:47,880 identify the solutions going forward the 1040 00:39:52,790 --> 00:39:49,740 procedures and processes it doesn't 1041 00:39:54,950 --> 00:39:52,800 sound like they are you know established 1042 00:39:55,730 --> 00:39:54,960 in any way so it'll be interesting to 1043 00:39:57,650 --> 00:39:55,740 see 1044 00:40:00,109 --> 00:39:57,660 come the end of June I believe when we 1045 00:40:01,190 --> 00:40:00,119 are likely to get another report Vinnie 1046 00:40:03,349 --> 00:40:01,200 are you expecting the federal government 1047 00:40:05,810 --> 00:40:03,359 to work quickly because I got news for 1048 00:40:10,250 --> 00:40:08,630 uh no I just real quick you pointed out 1049 00:40:12,349 --> 00:40:10,260 that posing the possible adversary 1050 00:40:14,569 --> 00:40:12,359 collection threat I don't know exactly 1051 00:40:18,109 --> 00:40:14,579 what was meant by that but I would say 1052 00:40:20,630 --> 00:40:18,119 that I I kind of inferred that pop 1053 00:40:22,609 --> 00:40:20,640 perhaps they're concerned about our 1054 00:40:24,890 --> 00:40:22,619 adversaries getting their hands on this 1055 00:40:27,589 --> 00:40:24,900 technology and the technological 1056 00:40:29,750 --> 00:40:27,599 disadvantage that would put us at 1057 00:40:30,470 --> 00:40:29,760 um not a not a happy thing to think 1058 00:40:32,569 --> 00:40:30,480 about 1059 00:40:34,849 --> 00:40:32,579 um but that is definitely what hurts my 1060 00:40:36,829 --> 00:40:34,859 ear up I think is what I got from that 1061 00:40:38,990 --> 00:40:36,839 the possible adversary collection is 1062 00:40:40,849 --> 00:40:39,000 could these could they be just thinking 1063 00:40:43,970 --> 00:40:40,859 about drones over nuclear facilities 1064 00:40:46,609 --> 00:40:43,980 collecting data on our systems and 1065 00:40:48,470 --> 00:40:46,619 capabilities maybe absolutely 1066 00:40:50,150 --> 00:40:48,480 interesting how it can be looked at 1067 00:40:52,210 --> 00:40:50,160 differently they love this vague 1068 00:40:54,589 --> 00:40:52,220 language don't they 1069 00:40:55,910 --> 00:40:54,599 Chris anything you could kind of glean 1070 00:40:58,910 --> 00:40:55,920 from that at all 1071 00:41:00,410 --> 00:40:58,920 yeah yeah I would like to think that 1072 00:41:03,410 --> 00:41:00,420 China 1073 00:41:06,530 --> 00:41:03,420 or Russia hasn't consistently in 1074 00:41:08,810 --> 00:41:06,540 constantly throughout the past maybe 1075 00:41:10,790 --> 00:41:08,820 perhaps 10 years and going on to this 1076 00:41:13,089 --> 00:41:10,800 day probably still 1077 00:41:15,650 --> 00:41:13,099 um on the East Coast being sending 1078 00:41:17,510 --> 00:41:15,660 drones or balloons whatever on the east 1079 00:41:21,770 --> 00:41:17,520 coast to spy on 1080 00:41:24,349 --> 00:41:21,780 um U.S Navy Naval aviators conducting 1081 00:41:26,150 --> 00:41:24,359 um conducting training missions and I'd 1082 00:41:29,329 --> 00:41:26,160 like to think that that hasn't been 1083 00:41:31,490 --> 00:41:29,339 happening so long and that still despite 1084 00:41:33,589 --> 00:41:31,500 all this and despite Ryan Gray's coming 1085 00:41:36,849 --> 00:41:33,599 out in 60 minutes that this is 1086 00:41:39,710 --> 00:41:36,859 continuing to happen despite it being 1087 00:41:42,829 --> 00:41:39,720 adverse through you know adversaries 1088 00:41:44,390 --> 00:41:42,839 perhaps spying on us I mean to think 1089 00:41:46,790 --> 00:41:44,400 that something would have been done by 1090 00:41:49,430 --> 00:41:46,800 now if it was just simple you know 1091 00:41:52,730 --> 00:41:49,440 balloons or drones 1092 00:41:54,650 --> 00:41:52,740 um doing that and um to my knowledge 1093 00:41:56,870 --> 00:41:54,660 um from from what's being made public 1094 00:41:59,750 --> 00:41:56,880 Naval aviators aren't aware that it's 1095 00:42:01,609 --> 00:41:59,760 Chinese or Russian as well so yeah 1096 00:42:03,109 --> 00:42:01,619 that's really important I think you know 1097 00:42:04,849 --> 00:42:03,119 as well I'd like to say that I was 1098 00:42:07,490 --> 00:42:04,859 disgusting it was a very very bright 1099 00:42:11,510 --> 00:42:07,500 person the other day about 1100 00:42:17,390 --> 00:42:11,520 this other angle that China and other 1101 00:42:18,950 --> 00:42:17,400 nations may may be looking into 1102 00:42:21,410 --> 00:42:18,960 um their own kind of like crash 1103 00:42:23,450 --> 00:42:21,420 retrievals let's say if any other 1104 00:42:26,270 --> 00:42:23,460 countries have 1105 00:42:30,109 --> 00:42:26,280 alleged craft 1106 00:42:32,510 --> 00:42:30,119 then that is definitely a threat 1107 00:42:34,430 --> 00:42:32,520 um because I mean whoever gets this 1108 00:42:37,490 --> 00:42:34,440 technology first kind of like rules the 1109 00:42:40,609 --> 00:42:37,500 world basically and China for instance 1110 00:42:42,890 --> 00:42:40,619 has the world's largest UFO organization 1111 00:42:43,870 --> 00:42:42,900 it's like one million over one million 1112 00:42:47,089 --> 00:42:43,880 members 1113 00:42:49,790 --> 00:42:47,099 and each one of them has to have like a 1114 00:42:52,250 --> 00:42:49,800 degree and have a written paper so these 1115 00:42:54,770 --> 00:42:52,260 are highly qualified people and the 1116 00:42:56,870 --> 00:42:54,780 stigma is not as big in China they just 1117 00:43:00,650 --> 00:42:56,880 want to look at the data and look at the 1118 00:43:01,370 --> 00:43:00,660 raw facts and also in China as well and 1119 00:43:04,010 --> 00:43:01,380 um 1120 00:43:05,510 --> 00:43:04,020 I guess not so much Russia considering 1121 00:43:07,910 --> 00:43:05,520 what's happened in the intelligence 1122 00:43:09,950 --> 00:43:07,920 front but in China they're able to keep 1123 00:43:11,990 --> 00:43:09,960 things very very tight in terms of 1124 00:43:13,970 --> 00:43:12,000 secrecy as well so you could possibly 1125 00:43:16,010 --> 00:43:13,980 have a huge number of people looking 1126 00:43:19,790 --> 00:43:16,020 into possible 1127 00:43:21,589 --> 00:43:19,800 um craft and studying it and that kind 1128 00:43:23,450 --> 00:43:21,599 of being kept 1129 00:43:26,470 --> 00:43:23,460 um Loctite and 1130 00:43:30,170 --> 00:43:26,480 if that is true that there are you know 1131 00:43:32,750 --> 00:43:30,180 craft of possible alien origin and the 1132 00:43:35,390 --> 00:43:32,760 Us and other nations have that 1133 00:43:38,750 --> 00:43:35,400 have these Craft 1134 00:43:41,390 --> 00:43:38,760 um then China perhaps has a real real 1135 00:43:44,150 --> 00:43:41,400 um Edge on everyone else 1136 00:43:45,950 --> 00:43:44,160 yeah I you're completely right Chris and 1137 00:43:47,210 --> 00:43:45,960 I I think one of the biggest arguments 1138 00:43:49,130 --> 00:43:47,220 against 1139 00:43:50,809 --> 00:43:49,140 um the majority of these reports being 1140 00:43:54,530 --> 00:43:50,819 Russian attack is the Ukraine war first 1141 00:43:56,809 --> 00:43:54,540 of all uh if you can't get a tank across 1142 00:43:59,270 --> 00:43:56,819 a creek then I highly doubt you're 1143 00:44:00,710 --> 00:43:59,280 shooting down UFOs and have your own 1144 00:44:01,250 --> 00:44:00,720 technology 1145 00:44:03,710 --> 00:44:01,260 um 1146 00:44:05,630 --> 00:44:03,720 you know I I'm a little more cautious on 1147 00:44:08,270 --> 00:44:05,640 this I think that 1148 00:44:10,490 --> 00:44:08,280 look there's bound to be some Chinese 1149 00:44:12,530 --> 00:44:10,500 drones i i in with it within these 1150 00:44:14,390 --> 00:44:12,540 reports there really are 1151 00:44:16,790 --> 00:44:14,400 um they're rapidly expanding their 1152 00:44:18,410 --> 00:44:16,800 technological capabilities 1153 00:44:21,470 --> 00:44:18,420 um especially on the west coast I would 1154 00:44:24,349 --> 00:44:21,480 not be shocked but like you said they 1155 00:44:26,030 --> 00:44:24,359 have this huge this huge organization 1156 00:44:28,069 --> 00:44:26,040 they have 1157 00:44:30,410 --> 00:44:28,079 um a clear interest in this topic so 1158 00:44:32,750 --> 00:44:30,420 they wouldn't be investigating this 1159 00:44:34,430 --> 00:44:32,760 topic if it was all them and so I think 1160 00:44:36,950 --> 00:44:34,440 it's we have to be very careful to 1161 00:44:39,770 --> 00:44:36,960 recognize that look some of these are 1162 00:44:42,230 --> 00:44:39,780 bound to be a drone here or there that's 1163 00:44:45,230 --> 00:44:42,240 okay we expect that 1164 00:44:46,970 --> 00:44:45,240 um but arguing that all of this can be 1165 00:44:49,250 --> 00:44:46,980 explained by Foreign adversary attack or 1166 00:44:51,470 --> 00:44:49,260 black Tech maybe one or two sightings 1167 00:44:53,809 --> 00:44:51,480 are maybe there's one class of sighting 1168 00:44:55,849 --> 00:44:53,819 that is uh black Tech that doesn't mean 1169 00:44:56,870 --> 00:44:55,859 that all of it can be explained in that 1170 00:44:59,390 --> 00:44:56,880 way 1171 00:45:01,069 --> 00:44:59,400 um but yeah I personally am very 1172 00:45:03,410 --> 00:45:01,079 concerned about the Chinese government 1173 00:45:06,170 --> 00:45:03,420 and how they are are looking at this 1174 00:45:09,190 --> 00:45:06,180 topic I think it's probably our biggest 1175 00:45:13,250 --> 00:45:09,200 threat at the moment in terms of the UAP 1176 00:45:15,890 --> 00:45:13,260 discussion and I I I think what we are 1177 00:45:20,210 --> 00:45:15,900 really seeing is 1178 00:45:22,790 --> 00:45:20,220 a huge imbalance in stigma because of 1179 00:45:24,230 --> 00:45:22,800 the Robertsons panel right 1180 00:45:26,030 --> 00:45:24,240 um a lot of other countries that didn't 1181 00:45:28,250 --> 00:45:26,040 have those efforts to intentionally 1182 00:45:31,250 --> 00:45:28,260 destigmatize or intentionally stigmatize 1183 00:45:33,829 --> 00:45:31,260 the topic don't have the same Hang-Ups 1184 00:45:35,630 --> 00:45:33,839 that we have in the US and it's really 1185 00:45:38,210 --> 00:45:35,640 going to harm our national security so 1186 00:45:39,650 --> 00:45:38,220 we've got to put our pedal to the metal 1187 00:45:42,349 --> 00:45:39,660 on this 1188 00:45:44,390 --> 00:45:42,359 um or we're going to be outmaneuvered 1189 00:45:45,530 --> 00:45:44,400 yeah well said I completely agree on 1190 00:45:47,030 --> 00:45:45,540 that 1191 00:45:48,410 --> 00:45:47,040 um just looking here at page eight I 1192 00:45:52,069 --> 00:45:48,420 believe that was just what was laid out 1193 00:45:53,329 --> 00:45:52,079 in the ndaa for fiscal year 2022 1194 00:45:54,589 --> 00:45:53,339 um so we don't need to kind of pull 1195 00:45:55,910 --> 00:45:54,599 anything from that correct me if I'm 1196 00:45:58,910 --> 00:45:55,920 wrong but I'm pretty sure that's all 1197 00:45:59,990 --> 00:45:58,920 that was just in in the ndaa 1198 00:46:03,170 --> 00:46:00,000 um 1199 00:46:05,450 --> 00:46:03,180 here we go uh unclassified I think that 1200 00:46:08,630 --> 00:46:05,460 again is still the end of that I I just 1201 00:46:10,430 --> 00:46:08,640 would refer people to to the ndaa or to 1202 00:46:12,650 --> 00:46:10,440 go and look at that themselves 1203 00:46:15,950 --> 00:46:12,660 uh establishment of the office and 1204 00:46:17,750 --> 00:46:15,960 duties based again on the ndaa and and 1205 00:46:19,490 --> 00:46:17,760 what they were asking them to do and 1206 00:46:21,470 --> 00:46:19,500 develop 1207 00:46:23,450 --> 00:46:21,480 there's your key terms 1208 00:46:24,950 --> 00:46:23,460 and it's interesting that top one there 1209 00:46:26,690 --> 00:46:24,960 range Fowler and then we happen to see 1210 00:46:29,809 --> 00:46:26,700 the release of these 1211 00:46:31,970 --> 00:46:29,819 well I think was it 70 or 90 redacted 1212 00:46:34,069 --> 00:46:31,980 range Fowlers uh appear yesterday 1213 00:46:36,710 --> 00:46:34,079 including the Nimitz and stuff I found 1214 00:46:38,329 --> 00:46:36,720 that really interesting uh I had a brief 1215 00:46:40,130 --> 00:46:38,339 look and couldn't really get much 1216 00:46:43,010 --> 00:46:40,140 information out of them because of the 1217 00:46:44,690 --> 00:46:43,020 heavily redacted areas but it was it it 1218 00:46:46,609 --> 00:46:44,700 just seems that we get things like all 1219 00:46:50,270 --> 00:46:46,619 in a little bunch and things seem to 1220 00:46:51,550 --> 00:46:50,280 drop at the same time it's it's strange 1221 00:46:55,370 --> 00:46:51,560 yes 1222 00:46:57,170 --> 00:46:55,380 there we go I think that is that so 1223 00:47:00,290 --> 00:46:57,180 is there anything anyone wants to say 1224 00:47:03,170 --> 00:47:00,300 before I move on 1225 00:47:07,010 --> 00:47:03,180 yeah I would just say that 1226 00:47:11,270 --> 00:47:07,020 um just going back to the page 1227 00:47:12,849 --> 00:47:11,280 where they say page five where they say 1228 00:47:15,170 --> 00:47:12,859 that um 1229 00:47:17,770 --> 00:47:15,180 arrows initial analysis and 1230 00:47:20,089 --> 00:47:17,780 characterization of the 360 Community 1231 00:47:22,730 --> 00:47:20,099 identified reports informed by a 1232 00:47:25,010 --> 00:47:22,740 multi-agency process judge more than 1233 00:47:26,690 --> 00:47:25,020 half as exhibiting unremarkable 1234 00:47:27,650 --> 00:47:26,700 characteristics it's very very important 1235 00:47:29,990 --> 00:47:27,660 because 1236 00:47:32,630 --> 00:47:30,000 this is just initial 1237 00:47:35,089 --> 00:47:32,640 analysis and characterization as it says 1238 00:47:38,170 --> 00:47:35,099 yeah and then in the paragraph after 1239 00:47:41,450 --> 00:47:38,180 that it um 1240 00:47:44,630 --> 00:47:41,460 it basically states that um 1241 00:47:47,030 --> 00:47:44,640 oh it says it hasn't been positively 1242 00:47:49,130 --> 00:47:47,040 identified 1243 00:47:50,510 --> 00:47:49,140 um yeah positive yeah so initial 1244 00:47:53,270 --> 00:47:50,520 characterization does not mean 1245 00:47:55,130 --> 00:47:53,280 positively resolved or identified 1246 00:47:57,710 --> 00:47:55,140 so that's really really important like 1247 00:47:59,329 --> 00:47:57,720 Katie was saying before that media tend 1248 00:48:01,790 --> 00:47:59,339 to be quite lazy so they'll just say oh 1249 00:48:03,309 --> 00:48:01,800 yeah more than half of them are balloons 1250 00:48:05,930 --> 00:48:03,319 or drones 1251 00:48:09,050 --> 00:48:05,940 and stuff like that so that that's 1252 00:48:12,530 --> 00:48:09,060 really important um and I'll point back 1253 00:48:15,109 --> 00:48:12,540 to the um the case the Omaha Case of 1254 00:48:18,470 --> 00:48:15,119 West Coast that came out 1255 00:48:19,370 --> 00:48:18,480 um with the the pyramid as it's been 1256 00:48:20,030 --> 00:48:19,380 said 1257 00:48:22,250 --> 00:48:20,040 um 1258 00:48:23,150 --> 00:48:22,260 grown or UAP you have a you want to look 1259 00:48:24,349 --> 00:48:23,160 at it 1260 00:48:27,710 --> 00:48:24,359 um I think there's still a lot to be 1261 00:48:29,329 --> 00:48:27,720 said on on that case and as you would 1262 00:48:32,690 --> 00:48:29,339 remember 1263 00:48:34,670 --> 00:48:32,700 um Scott Bray and the dod have stated 1264 00:48:37,309 --> 00:48:34,680 that these things are 1265 00:48:39,950 --> 00:48:37,319 um unmanned aircraft systems 1266 00:48:41,030 --> 00:48:39,960 so I want to ask a question I have asked 1267 00:48:43,430 --> 00:48:41,040 a question 1268 00:48:45,950 --> 00:48:43,440 was this just an initial analysis and 1269 00:48:49,670 --> 00:48:45,960 characterization of this case and has it 1270 00:48:51,470 --> 00:48:49,680 been positively resolved or identified I 1271 00:48:54,230 --> 00:48:51,480 think that's very very important I mean 1272 00:48:55,849 --> 00:48:54,240 if it is China and you don't know where 1273 00:48:58,730 --> 00:48:55,859 it came from 1274 00:49:00,470 --> 00:48:58,740 and you've not managed to 1275 00:49:02,210 --> 00:49:00,480 um fight you know you've not managed to 1276 00:49:03,230 --> 00:49:02,220 find the original and prove that it's 1277 00:49:05,690 --> 00:49:03,240 Chinese 1278 00:49:07,609 --> 00:49:05,700 that's really really bad and if it was a 1279 00:49:10,670 --> 00:49:07,619 Chinese this looks like really really 1280 00:49:12,890 --> 00:49:10,680 next gen technology especially if the US 1281 00:49:14,150 --> 00:49:12,900 can't explain it 1282 00:49:16,790 --> 00:49:14,160 um to start off with I mean it's only 1283 00:49:19,430 --> 00:49:16,800 recently they've said it it's uas and we 1284 00:49:21,890 --> 00:49:19,440 don't Nerf that Stephanie uas or not but 1285 00:49:24,050 --> 00:49:21,900 if it was their technology why would 1286 00:49:28,329 --> 00:49:24,060 they be flaunting it around the US 1287 00:49:31,010 --> 00:49:28,339 fleets so that it could be shot down 1288 00:49:32,210 --> 00:49:31,020 a lot of stuff still doesn't make sense 1289 00:49:34,190 --> 00:49:32,220 to me 1290 00:49:36,050 --> 00:49:34,200 I mean that's the tagline for this whole 1291 00:49:38,329 --> 00:49:36,060 this whole discussion right and lots of 1292 00:49:39,829 --> 00:49:38,339 ones that make sense I I think that if I 1293 00:49:42,770 --> 00:49:39,839 was a professional staffer right now 1294 00:49:45,050 --> 00:49:42,780 looking at this I would see the number 1295 00:49:47,569 --> 00:49:45,060 of reports in a single year and I would 1296 00:49:50,510 --> 00:49:47,579 say there is no way they have enough 1297 00:49:52,550 --> 00:49:50,520 resources to adequately investigate 1298 00:49:55,130 --> 00:49:52,560 these cases because the positively 1299 00:49:56,569 --> 00:49:55,140 identified caveat I think is really 1300 00:49:58,670 --> 00:49:56,579 interesting for us because we're like oh 1301 00:50:00,230 --> 00:49:58,680 great they're not done but in 1302 00:50:01,849 --> 00:50:00,240 practicality what that means is they're 1303 00:50:04,609 --> 00:50:01,859 putting that on a shelf because they 1304 00:50:08,089 --> 00:50:04,619 don't have the manpower to investigate 1305 00:50:09,829 --> 00:50:08,099 every single case to its conclusion 1306 00:50:12,530 --> 00:50:09,839 right I mean if you're looking at 500 1307 00:50:14,809 --> 00:50:12,540 some odd cases a year you're talking 1308 00:50:16,670 --> 00:50:14,819 about multiple cases a day are you 1309 00:50:18,410 --> 00:50:16,680 telling me that in a couple hours 1310 00:50:20,569 --> 00:50:18,420 they're solving some of these really 1311 00:50:21,890 --> 00:50:20,579 difficult cases no way and so what 1312 00:50:24,349 --> 00:50:21,900 they're doing is they're putting them 1313 00:50:26,089 --> 00:50:24,359 into a bucket and saying okay we think 1314 00:50:27,650 --> 00:50:26,099 we know what these are we can't say for 1315 00:50:29,630 --> 00:50:27,660 sure but we really need to focus on 1316 00:50:31,910 --> 00:50:29,640 these ones that are really obvious and 1317 00:50:34,550 --> 00:50:31,920 interesting and in that process we could 1318 00:50:36,470 --> 00:50:34,560 be missing a lot of information and so 1319 00:50:38,630 --> 00:50:36,480 what I really see with this is the need 1320 00:50:40,250 --> 00:50:38,640 for better Appropriations better 1321 00:50:42,530 --> 00:50:40,260 Manpower 1322 00:50:43,609 --> 00:50:42,540 um expanded scope of authority if they 1323 00:50:47,270 --> 00:50:43,619 show that they're doing their job 1324 00:50:51,170 --> 00:50:47,280 diligently and um honestly and so if I 1325 00:50:53,569 --> 00:50:51,180 was Arrow I would be clamoring telling 1326 00:50:55,430 --> 00:50:53,579 Congress give me more money give me more 1327 00:50:57,410 --> 00:50:55,440 stuff let us investigate this well 1328 00:50:59,870 --> 00:50:57,420 because this should be something that 1329 00:51:01,069 --> 00:50:59,880 every defense official wants to expand 1330 00:51:04,549 --> 00:51:01,079 my office 1331 00:51:07,130 --> 00:51:04,559 and so I I hope that's what happened but 1332 00:51:08,930 --> 00:51:07,140 you know if the goal isn't actually to 1333 00:51:11,569 --> 00:51:08,940 be transparent and solve this that'll 1334 00:51:13,190 --> 00:51:11,579 become very obvious because any 1335 00:51:18,049 --> 00:51:13,200 intelligence officer would look at this 1336 00:51:21,290 --> 00:51:18,059 and go we need better better analysis 1337 00:51:23,390 --> 00:51:21,300 here here yep very very good very good 1338 00:51:24,829 --> 00:51:23,400 point uh before we move on to the 1339 00:51:27,230 --> 00:51:24,839 slideshow I'm just going to read out a 1340 00:51:29,450 --> 00:51:27,240 couple of comments questions that I've 1341 00:51:31,609 --> 00:51:29,460 collated from the live chat first up 1342 00:51:33,470 --> 00:51:31,619 Jonathan Davis says I'd ignore this 1343 00:51:34,910 --> 00:51:33,480 report the next one is the first chance 1344 00:51:37,250 --> 00:51:34,920 we get to see what this team will 1345 00:51:39,950 --> 00:51:37,260 produce based on the new more powerful 1346 00:51:41,510 --> 00:51:39,960 Congressional requirements absolutely I 1347 00:51:43,609 --> 00:51:41,520 think that that that's really going to 1348 00:51:45,950 --> 00:51:43,619 be the test isn't it 1349 00:51:48,829 --> 00:51:45,960 um Lord bass says do you do you think 1350 00:51:52,190 --> 00:51:48,839 they would admit if it were adversary 1351 00:51:55,250 --> 00:51:52,200 probably not not publicly no because 1352 00:51:57,770 --> 00:51:55,260 that would say we can't control what's 1353 00:52:00,710 --> 00:51:57,780 in us guys we are not that good at 1354 00:52:04,549 --> 00:52:00,720 defending the country uh 1355 00:52:07,010 --> 00:52:04,559 yeah that's uh interesting uh next up 1356 00:52:08,870 --> 00:52:07,020 Susan goff's time traveling agent says 1357 00:52:11,690 --> 00:52:08,880 has there been any information released 1358 00:52:13,790 --> 00:52:11,700 on how long the classified report is no 1359 00:52:16,190 --> 00:52:13,800 I have not heard how long it is I've had 1360 00:52:17,650 --> 00:52:16,200 a few conversations but not about the 1361 00:52:22,190 --> 00:52:17,660 length 1362 00:52:24,290 --> 00:52:22,200 yes according to the sources that Josh 1363 00:52:27,349 --> 00:52:24,300 my memory is correct I think it was 1364 00:52:32,270 --> 00:52:27,359 double at least double in terms of pages 1365 00:52:36,890 --> 00:52:34,430 interesting I need to have a look back 1366 00:52:39,109 --> 00:52:36,900 at that and circle around but I think 1367 00:52:40,970 --> 00:52:39,119 uh Susan gough's time traveling agents 1368 00:52:42,290 --> 00:52:40,980 thank you for the kind donation yep hit 1369 00:52:43,790 --> 00:52:42,300 that like button and spread the news 1370 00:52:46,549 --> 00:52:43,800 indeed people 1371 00:52:48,829 --> 00:52:46,559 and finally Echoes In loaf I says is the 1372 00:52:51,589 --> 00:52:48,839 US defense Bill properly scrutinized or 1373 00:52:53,329 --> 00:52:51,599 investigated as the nuts and bolts the 1374 00:52:55,130 --> 00:52:53,339 way I see it is that there is funding 1375 00:52:57,230 --> 00:52:55,140 going to certain groups who have all the 1376 00:52:59,450 --> 00:52:57,240 answers 1377 00:53:01,970 --> 00:52:59,460 uh well first of all I would say the the 1378 00:53:03,829 --> 00:53:01,980 ndaa doesn't allocate funding so that's 1379 00:53:06,410 --> 00:53:03,839 an authorizations bill 1380 00:53:07,910 --> 00:53:06,420 um so that just allows these offices 1381 00:53:11,569 --> 00:53:07,920 um and 1382 00:53:13,250 --> 00:53:11,579 um uh programs to exist we need to look 1383 00:53:15,049 --> 00:53:13,260 at the Appropriations Bill and see how 1384 00:53:17,750 --> 00:53:15,059 much they're actually going to be given 1385 00:53:20,030 --> 00:53:17,760 to carry this out a very common trick in 1386 00:53:22,130 --> 00:53:20,040 Washington is to say sure we'll start 1387 00:53:24,230 --> 00:53:22,140 this office and then we'll give you two 1388 00:53:25,370 --> 00:53:24,240 million dollars to do it 1389 00:53:27,170 --> 00:53:25,380 um and that would be really really 1390 00:53:28,490 --> 00:53:27,180 obvious so that's what I would pay 1391 00:53:30,109 --> 00:53:28,500 attention to 1392 00:53:32,089 --> 00:53:30,119 excellent 1393 00:53:34,430 --> 00:53:32,099 right before we do move on I am just 1394 00:53:36,170 --> 00:53:34,440 going to quickly read out Lou Lou's Lou 1395 00:53:37,910 --> 00:53:36,180 Alexander was kind enough to give me a 1396 00:53:40,970 --> 00:53:37,920 quote regarding 1397 00:53:43,309 --> 00:53:40,980 uh I guess his views on on the UAP 1398 00:53:47,030 --> 00:53:43,319 report so let me just bring that over so 1399 00:53:49,309 --> 00:53:47,040 thank you I know it's I I Lou is always 1400 00:53:51,470 --> 00:53:49,319 very generous with his time and uh 1401 00:53:53,690 --> 00:53:51,480 providing me with uh you know short 1402 00:53:56,270 --> 00:53:53,700 videos or quotes so yeah I really 1403 00:53:57,530 --> 00:53:56,280 appreciate it so Lou says first of all I 1404 00:53:58,910 --> 00:53:57,540 would like to extend a thank you to 1405 00:54:00,650 --> 00:53:58,920 Vinnie and Chris for their tireless 1406 00:54:03,230 --> 00:54:00,660 efforts involving this topic over the 1407 00:54:04,549 --> 00:54:03,240 past few years thank you and of course a 1408 00:54:05,809 --> 00:54:04,559 big thank you to your audience who 1409 00:54:08,030 --> 00:54:05,819 continue to put pressure on our 1410 00:54:10,730 --> 00:54:08,040 government to pursue this issue people 1411 00:54:12,589 --> 00:54:10,740 in high places are listening this report 1412 00:54:15,589 --> 00:54:12,599 is yet another incremental step forward 1413 00:54:17,650 --> 00:54:15,599 towards real transparency from 144 1414 00:54:19,970 --> 00:54:17,660 unknown events to now over 500 1415 00:54:22,549 --> 00:54:19,980 personally I expect this trend to only 1416 00:54:24,530 --> 00:54:22,559 increase with time we must also remain 1417 00:54:26,150 --> 00:54:24,540 Vigilant and remind ourselves of what 1418 00:54:28,010 --> 00:54:26,160 Chris Mellon said in his most recent 1419 00:54:30,290 --> 00:54:28,020 article the more we look up the more 1420 00:54:33,470 --> 00:54:30,300 things we are going to see some will 1421 00:54:34,970 --> 00:54:33,480 have prosaic explanations some won't it 1422 00:54:36,290 --> 00:54:34,980 is these that remain completely out of 1423 00:54:38,630 --> 00:54:36,300 the realm of our current technology 1424 00:54:40,190 --> 00:54:38,640 Paradigm that we must focus on and not 1425 00:54:42,290 --> 00:54:40,200 allow ourselves the temptation of 1426 00:54:45,109 --> 00:54:42,300 writing off the truly unexamined as 1427 00:54:47,750 --> 00:54:45,119 simply a mirage or atmospheric anomaly I 1428 00:54:49,390 --> 00:54:47,760 trust our Pilots to win our Wars I also 1429 00:54:51,890 --> 00:54:49,400 trust our Pilots to tell the truth 1430 00:54:53,510 --> 00:54:51,900 lastly I trust our Pilots know the 1431 00:54:57,609 --> 00:54:53,520 difference between a seagull and 1432 00:55:02,569 --> 00:55:00,890 amazing thank you Lou so much so yeah 1433 00:55:04,130 --> 00:55:02,579 it's good to always get a statement from 1434 00:55:05,030 --> 00:55:04,140 Lou on his thoughts on what's Happening 1435 00:55:06,490 --> 00:55:05,040 so 1436 00:55:10,790 --> 00:55:06,500 yeah 1437 00:55:12,290 --> 00:55:10,800 that's great uh right so you know one 1438 00:55:13,609 --> 00:55:12,300 thing I will say as well is that the 1439 00:55:14,990 --> 00:55:13,619 Chris mellon's article was really 1440 00:55:16,849 --> 00:55:15,000 interesting pulling out his key 1441 00:55:18,410 --> 00:55:16,859 takeaways that is linked in the 1442 00:55:20,210 --> 00:55:18,420 description for people to go and take a 1443 00:55:21,650 --> 00:55:20,220 look at as well as the couple of the 1444 00:55:24,470 --> 00:55:21,660 videos that have cropped up with John 1445 00:55:26,390 --> 00:55:24,480 Radcliffe Andre Carson in the media the 1446 00:55:27,589 --> 00:55:26,400 last day or two go and check those out I 1447 00:55:29,450 --> 00:55:27,599 was gonna play them but then I was 1448 00:55:31,069 --> 00:55:29,460 worried about copyrights and all this so 1449 00:55:33,530 --> 00:55:31,079 I just recommend people go and check 1450 00:55:35,569 --> 00:55:33,540 them out for themselves and uh take what 1451 00:55:38,829 --> 00:55:35,579 you will from it because it you know it 1452 00:55:41,589 --> 00:55:38,839 was very interesting uh let's move on to 1453 00:55:44,990 --> 00:55:41,599 Kirkpatrick's slideshow 1454 00:55:48,290 --> 00:55:45,000 uh here we go 1455 00:55:51,230 --> 00:55:48,300 uh and this was a lot better I can't 1456 00:55:52,849 --> 00:55:51,240 remember if anyone can who he presented 1457 00:55:54,049 --> 00:55:52,859 it to I did have it written down and I 1458 00:55:55,030 --> 00:55:54,059 can't remember where I wrote it down it 1459 00:55:58,790 --> 00:55:55,040 was yeah 1460 00:56:01,730 --> 00:55:58,800 yeah and it's an aviation as well was it 1461 00:56:06,049 --> 00:56:01,740 a civil aviation group maybe right so 1462 00:56:11,809 --> 00:56:09,170 I guess it really lays out Arrow 1463 00:56:14,150 --> 00:56:11,819 maybe in an easier to understand uh 1464 00:56:17,390 --> 00:56:14,160 terminology compared to the uh mishmash 1465 00:56:19,549 --> 00:56:17,400 of the UAP report so um 1466 00:56:21,410 --> 00:56:19,559 yeah you guys feel free if there's 1467 00:56:23,450 --> 00:56:21,420 anything that jumps out to you I did 1468 00:56:26,030 --> 00:56:23,460 like on this that it really clearly did 1469 00:56:29,270 --> 00:56:26,040 say anomalous spaceborne Airborne 1470 00:56:31,490 --> 00:56:29,280 Seaborn or trans medium like just right 1471 00:56:34,010 --> 00:56:31,500 in your face was just brilliant on the 1472 00:56:36,950 --> 00:56:34,020 get-go I think Chris mellon's really 1473 00:56:38,870 --> 00:56:36,960 excited he finally saw spaceborne yeah 1474 00:56:41,089 --> 00:56:38,880 he's been really favoring that for a 1475 00:56:42,710 --> 00:56:41,099 while now so it's nice to see 1476 00:56:44,390 --> 00:56:42,720 um and then also it you know going on to 1477 00:56:47,390 --> 00:56:44,400 say that something is not attributable 1478 00:56:50,270 --> 00:56:47,400 at attribute attributable to known 1479 00:56:52,069 --> 00:56:50,280 actors or causes so you know really 1480 00:56:54,650 --> 00:56:52,079 laying out that this is for genuine 1481 00:56:57,170 --> 00:56:54,660 unidentified anomalous objects so 1482 00:56:59,390 --> 00:56:57,180 yeah that's great 1483 00:57:01,130 --> 00:56:59,400 um and it says here complex hazards and 1484 00:57:02,809 --> 00:57:01,140 threats across service Regional and 1485 00:57:05,569 --> 00:57:02,819 domain boundaries 1486 00:57:06,950 --> 00:57:05,579 yeah very interesting language 1487 00:57:11,750 --> 00:57:06,960 uh 1488 00:57:13,790 --> 00:57:11,760 there's anything you really want to sort 1489 00:57:15,290 --> 00:57:13,800 of pick out please I might miss it so go 1490 00:57:16,549 --> 00:57:15,300 ahead 1491 00:57:18,890 --> 00:57:16,559 um 1492 00:57:21,170 --> 00:57:18,900 talking about characteristics behavioral 1493 00:57:25,250 --> 00:57:21,180 technical physical 1494 00:57:29,569 --> 00:57:26,630 I don't know what they mean by the 1495 00:57:31,250 --> 00:57:29,579 disposition that's observed phenomena I 1496 00:57:33,170 --> 00:57:31,260 mean do they mean characteristics I mean 1497 00:57:34,130 --> 00:57:33,180 because that's that's not what they oh 1498 00:57:36,049 --> 00:57:34,140 no that's not what they mean because 1499 00:57:37,190 --> 00:57:36,059 that's a separate bullet point in the 1500 00:57:38,630 --> 00:57:37,200 very beginning so I want to know what 1501 00:57:40,250 --> 00:57:38,640 the disposition is 1502 00:57:41,150 --> 00:57:40,260 but it's nice in the vision to see that 1503 00:57:42,770 --> 00:57:41,160 they're talking about greater 1504 00:57:44,890 --> 00:57:42,780 transparency now does that mean greater 1505 00:57:49,450 --> 00:57:44,900 transparency within the IC and the dod 1506 00:57:52,010 --> 00:57:49,460 or outside into public 1507 00:57:55,430 --> 00:57:52,020 I think that's keeping it internal still 1508 00:57:59,589 --> 00:57:58,010 yeah yeah absolutely 1509 00:58:05,270 --> 00:57:59,599 um 1510 00:58:06,710 --> 00:58:05,280 got given the slides from 1511 00:58:09,410 --> 00:58:06,720 Sue as well 1512 00:58:12,049 --> 00:58:09,420 [Music] 1513 00:58:16,150 --> 00:58:12,059 yeah I mean 1514 00:58:19,370 --> 00:58:16,160 any assess technological gap between the 1515 00:58:21,589 --> 00:58:19,380 phenomena and the United States on page 1516 00:58:23,450 --> 00:58:21,599 three 1517 00:58:25,670 --> 00:58:23,460 um in terms of vulnerabilities that's 1518 00:58:27,109 --> 00:58:25,680 really important and it was quite 1519 00:58:28,790 --> 00:58:27,119 interesting because Radcliffe when he 1520 00:58:30,349 --> 00:58:28,800 was speaking today was saying that this 1521 00:58:33,109 --> 00:58:30,359 is technology that we don't possess we 1522 00:58:34,910 --> 00:58:33,119 need to know that and he was questioning 1523 00:58:36,770 --> 00:58:34,920 that the term foreign as well whether 1524 00:58:38,450 --> 00:58:36,780 that be a government or something else 1525 00:58:40,490 --> 00:58:38,460 it was like okay what do we mean by the 1526 00:58:42,109 --> 00:58:40,500 definition of foreign now although I'd 1527 00:58:44,569 --> 00:58:42,119 say in the report it's made quite clear 1528 00:58:46,789 --> 00:58:44,579 that it's foreign government but um it's 1529 00:58:48,970 --> 00:58:46,799 another term to look out for in terms of 1530 00:58:53,289 --> 00:58:48,980 them trying all right technology 1531 00:58:55,370 --> 00:58:53,299 Florida it could be a synonym for aliens 1532 00:58:56,809 --> 00:58:55,380 I thought this line was interesting 1533 00:58:58,670 --> 00:58:56,819 where it says threats to the immediate 1534 00:59:01,190 --> 00:58:58,680 safety of U.S citizens and government 1535 00:59:01,970 --> 00:59:01,200 facilities across domains is priority I 1536 00:59:03,530 --> 00:59:01,980 mean 1537 00:59:05,450 --> 00:59:03,540 that's the first time I've ever seen 1538 00:59:06,890 --> 00:59:05,460 them say anything about any kind of 1539 00:59:09,770 --> 00:59:06,900 possible 1540 00:59:12,049 --> 00:59:09,780 threat or lack of safety to General 1541 00:59:14,510 --> 00:59:12,059 citizenship of a country I mean that's 1542 00:59:15,890 --> 00:59:14,520 scary yeah and what's really interesting 1543 00:59:17,569 --> 00:59:15,900 is like coming from a military 1544 00:59:20,450 --> 00:59:17,579 intelligence background if they were 1545 00:59:21,170 --> 00:59:20,460 talking about like military Pilots or 1546 00:59:23,569 --> 00:59:21,180 something like that they would say 1547 00:59:25,730 --> 00:59:23,579 service lovers so the the use of the 1548 00:59:27,410 --> 00:59:25,740 term or Warfighter or something like 1549 00:59:30,589 --> 00:59:27,420 that they use the term citizen is very 1550 00:59:32,329 --> 00:59:30,599 interesting absolutely just address this 1551 00:59:34,330 --> 00:59:32,339 would you mind Chris were these slides 1552 00:59:36,109 --> 00:59:34,340 leaked as a Counterpoint to the report 1553 00:59:39,910 --> 00:59:36,119 [Music] 1554 00:59:42,770 --> 00:59:39,920 so what happened was that he gave it 1555 00:59:46,069 --> 00:59:42,780 Wednesday that he gave the presentation 1556 00:59:48,950 --> 00:59:46,079 and yeah I was trying to get in touch 1557 00:59:51,230 --> 00:59:48,960 with the uh with the organizers to see 1558 00:59:52,849 --> 00:59:51,240 if I could perhaps watch it live and 1559 00:59:54,829 --> 00:59:52,859 then they were basically saying oh we're 1560 00:59:56,089 --> 00:59:54,839 not doing it as a live stream I was like 1561 00:59:58,010 --> 00:59:56,099 okay cool 1562 01:00:00,230 --> 00:59:58,020 um and then I contacted Susan Goff 1563 01:00:01,970 --> 01:00:00,240 slides but I mean Dean Johnson has 1564 01:00:03,829 --> 01:00:01,980 already releasing by the time 1565 01:00:05,870 --> 01:00:03,839 um Susan gave them to me and 1566 01:00:07,789 --> 01:00:05,880 unfortunately they had no transcript for 1567 01:00:09,589 --> 01:00:07,799 this event either which is quite 1568 01:00:11,030 --> 01:00:09,599 disappointing but you know if there's 1569 01:00:13,609 --> 01:00:11,040 anyone out there that was there for this 1570 01:00:15,289 --> 01:00:13,619 event that wants to uh talk to me 1571 01:00:17,569 --> 01:00:15,299 um please come forward and um yeah 1572 01:00:19,069 --> 01:00:17,579 message me up on Twitter yeah just 1573 01:00:22,910 --> 01:00:19,079 confirm it was January the 11th 1574 01:00:25,010 --> 01:00:22,920 Wednesday the 11th uh I believe it was 1575 01:00:27,770 --> 01:00:26,809 yeah Katie there's that line that you 1576 01:00:29,630 --> 01:00:27,780 were talking about earlier the 1577 01:00:31,730 --> 01:00:29,640 consequence of such moderate to high 1578 01:00:33,770 --> 01:00:31,740 potentially leading to adversarial 1579 01:00:35,030 --> 01:00:33,780 misattribution of UAP to the United 1580 01:00:37,069 --> 01:00:35,040 States 1581 01:00:40,030 --> 01:00:37,079 so yeah that's yeah I mean that could 1582 01:00:43,010 --> 01:00:40,040 that could be catastrophic I mean 1583 01:00:44,270 --> 01:00:43,020 we know that the UAP are coming into our 1584 01:00:46,490 --> 01:00:44,280 country and buzzing nuclear 1585 01:00:49,069 --> 01:00:46,500 installations imagine if they think that 1586 01:00:51,289 --> 01:00:49,079 we're doing that in Iran right or or 1587 01:00:53,930 --> 01:00:51,299 something like that that would be very 1588 01:00:56,690 --> 01:00:53,940 volatile and sensitive yeah and then 1589 01:00:59,150 --> 01:00:56,700 that section of the sorry go on sorry 1590 01:01:00,710 --> 01:00:59,160 no no no go for it I just wanted to 1591 01:01:02,089 --> 01:01:00,720 highlight that uh below there in the 1592 01:01:04,309 --> 01:01:02,099 bottom right where it says allies and 1593 01:01:07,250 --> 01:01:04,319 strategic competitors apply resources to 1594 01:01:09,349 --> 01:01:07,260 observe identify and attribute UAP and 1595 01:01:11,210 --> 01:01:09,359 that link there is actually a link to to 1596 01:01:13,730 --> 01:01:11,220 a Chinese site 1597 01:01:16,089 --> 01:01:13,740 so 1598 01:01:20,270 --> 01:01:18,349 it's already thrown up a security 1599 01:01:22,549 --> 01:01:20,280 warning so I'm not going to do it right 1600 01:01:24,289 --> 01:01:22,559 now but that was really that's the only 1601 01:01:27,230 --> 01:01:24,299 Link in the entire 1602 01:01:29,809 --> 01:01:27,240 slideshow that you know external link 1603 01:01:33,549 --> 01:01:29,819 and it's to Chinese yeah it's it's yeah 1604 01:01:36,049 --> 01:01:33,559 makes you ask a lot of questions yeah 1605 01:01:37,730 --> 01:01:36,059 if I was a lobbyist I'd be looking at 1606 01:01:40,670 --> 01:01:37,740 how much money the Chinese are putting 1607 01:01:42,230 --> 01:01:40,680 onto this and I would go to the members 1608 01:01:43,730 --> 01:01:42,240 of Congress and say oh you really want 1609 01:01:44,450 --> 01:01:43,740 to spend less than Chinese or spending 1610 01:01:47,270 --> 01:01:44,460 on this 1611 01:01:49,250 --> 01:01:47,280 that would be my strategy so I I don't 1612 01:01:51,410 --> 01:01:49,260 know if we if we have information on 1613 01:01:53,990 --> 01:01:51,420 what the dollar sign is behind the 1614 01:01:56,690 --> 01:01:54,000 Chinese effort but that's an easy way to 1615 01:01:59,450 --> 01:01:56,700 get uh members of Congress on your side 1616 01:02:01,609 --> 01:01:59,460 yes 1617 01:02:03,589 --> 01:02:01,619 absolutely yeah I think um China calls 1618 01:02:05,390 --> 01:02:03,599 are unidentified is it like air 1619 01:02:07,309 --> 01:02:05,400 conditions 1620 01:02:10,670 --> 01:02:07,319 um yeah unidentified air conditioners 1621 01:02:12,410 --> 01:02:10,680 that's how the Chinese refer to as the 1622 01:02:15,950 --> 01:02:12,420 people's Liberation Army no connection 1623 01:02:18,770 --> 01:02:15,960 to Liberation Times by the way uh 1624 01:02:21,829 --> 01:02:18,780 pretty interesting but I mean I wrote an 1625 01:02:23,450 --> 01:02:21,839 article on Fry on Friday so apparently 1626 01:02:25,849 --> 01:02:23,460 tomorrow the decision is going to be 1627 01:02:26,450 --> 01:02:25,859 made in terms of the 1628 01:02:29,210 --> 01:02:26,460 um 1629 01:02:30,589 --> 01:02:29,220 the the UN decision for San Marino 1630 01:02:33,170 --> 01:02:30,599 whether they press ahead of it which 1631 01:02:36,530 --> 01:02:33,180 should be quite exciting and this whole 1632 01:02:40,030 --> 01:02:36,540 effort can trace its origins in China 1633 01:02:43,309 --> 01:02:40,040 because in 2018 a bunch of like Chinese 1634 01:02:45,349 --> 01:02:43,319 researchers for some reason decided to 1635 01:02:48,770 --> 01:02:45,359 do these huge like 1636 01:02:50,270 --> 01:02:48,780 um symposiums on on UFOs 1637 01:02:51,829 --> 01:02:50,280 um one being held in I think it's 1638 01:02:54,410 --> 01:02:51,839 Chongqing 1639 01:02:56,329 --> 01:02:54,420 um China and the other in Moscow and 1640 01:02:59,150 --> 01:02:56,339 Russia it was kind of like a joint kind 1641 01:02:59,950 --> 01:02:59,160 of like Russian Chinese initiative and I 1642 01:03:02,630 --> 01:02:59,960 mean 1643 01:03:04,190 --> 01:03:02,640 yeah from the footage you can find it 1644 01:03:06,410 --> 01:03:04,200 online I'm hoping it's still there but 1645 01:03:08,150 --> 01:03:06,420 you can see like the one in Moscow and 1646 01:03:11,390 --> 01:03:08,160 you've got a whole bunch of like 1647 01:03:14,150 --> 01:03:11,400 military in there like soldiers 1648 01:03:16,609 --> 01:03:14,160 um their uniforms on and they've got 1649 01:03:18,170 --> 01:03:16,619 um they've got Russian cosmonauts 1650 01:03:20,089 --> 01:03:18,180 present as well and they've got big 1651 01:03:22,130 --> 01:03:20,099 Industries and represent 1652 01:03:24,829 --> 01:03:22,140 you know representatives there from from 1653 01:03:27,010 --> 01:03:24,839 different fate um trade federations and 1654 01:03:30,589 --> 01:03:27,020 stuff and um there's a really big 1655 01:03:32,150 --> 01:03:30,599 well-organized thing and um what they 1656 01:03:33,410 --> 01:03:32,160 did was they got lots of representatives 1657 01:03:36,289 --> 01:03:33,420 from different countries like Gary 1658 01:03:37,970 --> 01:03:36,299 hasseltine from the UK for example I 1659 01:03:41,089 --> 01:03:37,980 think they they bought him over for one 1660 01:03:42,410 --> 01:03:41,099 of the events and the plan was to have a 1661 01:03:45,589 --> 01:03:42,420 third 1662 01:03:48,950 --> 01:03:45,599 um event in heze in China 1663 01:03:50,990 --> 01:03:48,960 um and the plan was at that event to 1664 01:03:52,789 --> 01:03:51,000 actually come up with a plan and 1665 01:03:55,430 --> 01:03:52,799 coordinate going to the United Nations 1666 01:03:57,530 --> 01:03:55,440 to get the sport out of the UN and this 1667 01:03:59,690 --> 01:03:57,540 is crazy because as you would know like 1668 01:04:02,410 --> 01:03:59,700 nothing in China happens if you don't 1669 01:04:04,910 --> 01:04:02,420 have the um 1670 01:04:06,710 --> 01:04:04,920 exactly if if you don't have the 1671 01:04:08,630 --> 01:04:06,720 government saying it's okay then you 1672 01:04:10,789 --> 01:04:08,640 can't do it so I just thought this was 1673 01:04:12,890 --> 01:04:10,799 really interesting and all of a sudden 1674 01:04:15,049 --> 01:04:12,900 this thing just fell away 1675 01:04:18,710 --> 01:04:15,059 um so I think there's a big undercurrent 1676 01:04:20,030 --> 01:04:18,720 of um of interest in China which is yeah 1677 01:04:22,910 --> 01:04:20,040 which may be bigger than some of us May 1678 01:04:25,190 --> 01:04:22,920 me May realize 1679 01:04:27,109 --> 01:04:25,200 well and honestly like I'm I'm shocked 1680 01:04:29,870 --> 01:04:27,119 by that I'm shocked that the Chinese and 1681 01:04:31,190 --> 01:04:29,880 the Russians want to take this to the 1682 01:04:32,690 --> 01:04:31,200 U.N 1683 01:04:35,150 --> 01:04:32,700 um because I know that like in the US 1684 01:04:37,130 --> 01:04:35,160 for example while there may be 1685 01:04:38,450 --> 01:04:37,140 um positives to going to the UN and 1686 01:04:39,950 --> 01:04:38,460 sharing information with our allies and 1687 01:04:42,349 --> 01:04:39,960 whatnot there's going to be a big group 1688 01:04:43,730 --> 01:04:42,359 of people that say no we're not sharing 1689 01:04:45,289 --> 01:04:43,740 any information with anyone we don't 1690 01:04:46,970 --> 01:04:45,299 want to you know that that loses our 1691 01:04:48,109 --> 01:04:46,980 strategic Advantage 1692 01:04:50,030 --> 01:04:48,119 um so 1693 01:04:52,010 --> 01:04:50,040 yeah I'm really interested in what the 1694 01:04:53,930 --> 01:04:52,020 Chinese and Russians think they can gain 1695 01:04:56,990 --> 01:04:53,940 from that you know like what's what's 1696 01:04:58,730 --> 01:04:57,000 their end game is it is it truly just oh 1697 01:05:00,530 --> 01:04:58,740 yeah we want to be partners with 1698 01:05:01,609 --> 01:05:00,540 everyone and get the information I don't 1699 01:05:05,329 --> 01:05:01,619 know 1700 01:05:06,589 --> 01:05:05,339 um but I would be a little skeptical I'm 1701 01:05:07,370 --> 01:05:06,599 always a little skeptical of these 1702 01:05:09,170 --> 01:05:07,380 things 1703 01:05:10,670 --> 01:05:09,180 um but it'll be interesting to see 1704 01:05:12,170 --> 01:05:10,680 that's not to say that I don't think the 1705 01:05:13,549 --> 01:05:12,180 UN initiative is a good idea I think 1706 01:05:15,109 --> 01:05:13,559 it's a great idea 1707 01:05:17,390 --> 01:05:15,119 um but I think everyone's going to come 1708 01:05:19,250 --> 01:05:17,400 to that with different motivations and 1709 01:05:20,089 --> 01:05:19,260 different expectations of what they get 1710 01:05:22,309 --> 01:05:20,099 out of it 1711 01:05:24,829 --> 01:05:22,319 yeah no definitely 1712 01:05:27,289 --> 01:05:24,839 now this page really stood out to me a 1713 01:05:29,270 --> 01:05:27,299 few points in that first box there it's 1714 01:05:31,190 --> 01:05:29,280 talking about capability capabilities 1715 01:05:33,950 --> 01:05:31,200 for optimized cross-functional UAP 1716 01:05:35,329 --> 01:05:33,960 detection tracking mitigation and 1717 01:05:38,569 --> 01:05:35,339 Recovery 1718 01:05:43,910 --> 01:05:38,579 uh so of course that really screamed you 1719 01:05:47,930 --> 01:05:43,920 know recovery of UAP okay okay okay okay 1720 01:05:51,470 --> 01:05:47,940 uh probably done it before 1721 01:05:52,190 --> 01:05:51,480 maybe yeah you never know 1722 01:05:53,870 --> 01:05:52,200 um 1723 01:05:55,910 --> 01:05:53,880 and then this second one revealing and 1724 01:05:58,430 --> 01:05:55,920 exploiting Elusive and enigmatic 1725 01:06:02,030 --> 01:05:58,440 signatures through Advanced Technologies 1726 01:06:06,109 --> 01:06:02,040 which is you know exploiting 1727 01:06:08,750 --> 01:06:06,119 hmm yes that that that's really really 1728 01:06:10,789 --> 01:06:08,760 interesting I mean 1729 01:06:14,450 --> 01:06:10,799 um one of the first articles on 1730 01:06:16,730 --> 01:06:14,460 Liberation times was was done by Bob 1731 01:06:21,049 --> 01:06:16,740 liskin who's the former 1732 01:06:23,950 --> 01:06:21,059 um Marine intelligence officer and that 1733 01:06:27,410 --> 01:06:23,960 was all about signature management 1734 01:06:29,809 --> 01:06:27,420 and uh yeah that that's really really 1735 01:06:31,970 --> 01:06:29,819 interesting it was kind of like um I 1736 01:06:33,349 --> 01:06:31,980 think on the East Coast if you if you 1737 01:06:35,809 --> 01:06:33,359 look at what's out there in terms of 1738 01:06:37,630 --> 01:06:35,819 public information it seemed as though 1739 01:06:39,890 --> 01:06:37,640 that there was a certain degree of 1740 01:06:43,130 --> 01:06:39,900 signature management taking place that 1741 01:06:45,890 --> 01:06:43,140 we couldn't explain 1742 01:06:47,390 --> 01:06:45,900 um so yeah that that's that's really 1743 01:06:49,490 --> 01:06:47,400 really interesting there and if you're 1744 01:06:50,950 --> 01:06:49,500 getting into it from an intelligence 1745 01:06:53,930 --> 01:06:50,960 perspective 1746 01:06:55,670 --> 01:06:53,940 that's one of like the key the key 1747 01:06:57,470 --> 01:06:55,680 things 1748 01:06:59,089 --> 01:06:57,480 um because in the last report it said 1749 01:07:01,670 --> 01:06:59,099 the uaptf 1750 01:07:03,950 --> 01:07:01,680 TF holds a small amount of data that 1751 01:07:06,109 --> 01:07:03,960 appear to share UAP 1752 01:07:08,930 --> 01:07:06,119 um demonstrating 1753 01:07:11,690 --> 01:07:08,940 acceleration or degree of signature 1754 01:07:14,390 --> 01:07:11,700 management so yeah signature management 1755 01:07:16,609 --> 01:07:14,400 is basically used in the military and 1756 01:07:18,770 --> 01:07:16,619 defense context as a signature would be 1757 01:07:21,529 --> 01:07:18,780 any manner of identification that can be 1758 01:07:23,329 --> 01:07:21,539 detected by an adversary so an example 1759 01:07:25,549 --> 01:07:23,339 would be considered a signature for 1760 01:07:27,890 --> 01:07:25,559 example that would be a read or 1761 01:07:30,710 --> 01:07:27,900 cross-section active or passive signal 1762 01:07:33,049 --> 01:07:30,720 submitted infrared emissions or even 1763 01:07:35,329 --> 01:07:33,059 distinctions that can be seen visually 1764 01:07:37,970 --> 01:07:35,339 meaning an identification can be made 1765 01:07:40,609 --> 01:07:37,980 and um by the way those are not my own 1766 01:07:44,690 --> 01:07:40,619 words there's a block I'm not that 1767 01:07:47,089 --> 01:07:44,700 intelligent so no no so that I think 1768 01:07:49,609 --> 01:07:47,099 that's like a really really important 1769 01:07:52,849 --> 01:07:49,619 um thing to kind of like hone in on 1770 01:07:54,230 --> 01:07:52,859 yeah absolutely absolutely 1771 01:07:55,789 --> 01:07:54,240 and then on this next box the 1772 01:07:57,490 --> 01:07:55,799 interdisciplinary analysis you know 1773 01:08:00,470 --> 01:07:57,500 talking about peer-reviewed conclusions 1774 01:08:02,029 --> 01:08:00,480 uh using the scientific and intelligence 1775 01:08:03,589 --> 01:08:02,039 method I mean that's what we always want 1776 01:08:06,230 --> 01:08:03,599 isn't it we want 1777 01:08:08,029 --> 01:08:06,240 peer-reviewed work to be done on this 1778 01:08:11,750 --> 01:08:08,039 subject and you know 1779 01:08:14,990 --> 01:08:13,549 in the US 1780 01:08:18,169 --> 01:08:15,000 Zoom 1781 01:08:20,269 --> 01:08:18,179 to see a legitimate Journal 1782 01:08:22,309 --> 01:08:20,279 you know like let's let's because that's 1783 01:08:23,450 --> 01:08:22,319 how good science is done 1784 01:08:26,209 --> 01:08:23,460 um you know we've talked about this a 1785 01:08:28,729 --> 01:08:26,219 lot uh but we have to be able to 1786 01:08:29,870 --> 01:08:28,739 use our scientific resources in this 1787 01:08:31,910 --> 01:08:29,880 country we have some of the best 1788 01:08:34,309 --> 01:08:31,920 scientists in the world and we're not 1789 01:08:36,470 --> 01:08:34,319 utilizing their expertise because we're 1790 01:08:38,150 --> 01:08:36,480 not allowing this process to actually go 1791 01:08:39,950 --> 01:08:38,160 through peer review which strengthens 1792 01:08:43,249 --> 01:08:39,960 our assessment and our analysis of 1793 01:08:45,289 --> 01:08:43,259 capabilities yeah absolutely 1794 01:08:47,090 --> 01:08:45,299 and in this last box the thing the two 1795 01:08:48,769 --> 01:08:47,100 small parts that stood out to me were 1796 01:08:50,209 --> 01:08:48,779 obviously transparency building trust 1797 01:08:52,430 --> 01:08:50,219 and transparency but the fact that it 1798 01:08:53,689 --> 01:08:52,440 mentions oversight authorities you know 1799 01:08:55,070 --> 01:08:53,699 it's nice to know that they're aware 1800 01:08:56,630 --> 01:08:55,080 that there are people looking over their 1801 01:08:58,849 --> 01:08:56,640 shoulder and breathing down their necks 1802 01:09:00,650 --> 01:08:58,859 you know that that really is important 1803 01:09:03,410 --> 01:09:00,660 so 1804 01:09:06,349 --> 01:09:03,420 yeah what a great page that is 1805 01:09:08,030 --> 01:09:06,359 yeah absolutely 1806 01:09:10,370 --> 01:09:08,040 oh and then this next one is obviously 1807 01:09:11,510 --> 01:09:10,380 talking about educating aviators and and 1808 01:09:13,430 --> 01:09:11,520 Crews 1809 01:09:16,249 --> 01:09:13,440 so the fact that it's talking about 1810 01:09:18,590 --> 01:09:16,259 sharing UAP data you know uh with 1811 01:09:20,269 --> 01:09:18,600 aviators it's like like this is what 1812 01:09:21,470 --> 01:09:20,279 you've got to look out for and showing 1813 01:09:24,229 --> 01:09:21,480 them like 1814 01:09:25,669 --> 01:09:24,239 really interesting stuff like that that 1815 01:09:27,890 --> 01:09:25,679 you know that's kind of what I gleaned 1816 01:09:30,410 --> 01:09:27,900 from that uh just obviously help them 1817 01:09:32,390 --> 01:09:30,420 identify and Report things better uh 1818 01:09:34,010 --> 01:09:32,400 encouraging reporting destigmatizing 1819 01:09:36,650 --> 01:09:34,020 these are all buzzwords that we like to 1820 01:09:38,990 --> 01:09:36,660 hear but I still for some reason a part 1821 01:09:40,970 --> 01:09:39,000 of me is still not convinced over you 1822 01:09:45,050 --> 01:09:40,980 know in the grand scheme of things 1823 01:09:49,669 --> 01:09:47,809 yeah yeah I think there's questions over 1824 01:09:51,050 --> 01:09:49,679 this I mean there's two distinct things 1825 01:09:52,849 --> 01:09:51,060 are happening at the moment obviously 1826 01:09:54,950 --> 01:09:52,859 Kirkpatrick's focusing here in this 1827 01:09:57,110 --> 01:09:54,960 presentation about the active 1828 01:09:59,810 --> 01:09:57,120 investigation 1829 01:10:02,270 --> 01:09:59,820 um which is ongoing in terms of events 1830 01:10:04,550 --> 01:10:02,280 that are being reported but there's a 1831 01:10:06,290 --> 01:10:04,560 there's another stream of things so even 1832 01:10:09,590 --> 01:10:06,300 if you're not 1833 01:10:11,930 --> 01:10:09,600 totally won over by this 1834 01:10:13,390 --> 01:10:11,940 The Whistleblower stuff is going to be 1835 01:10:16,910 --> 01:10:13,400 huge 1836 01:10:19,490 --> 01:10:16,920 I mean you've got Chris Mellon someone 1837 01:10:22,010 --> 01:10:19,500 of his position using those last lines 1838 01:10:24,110 --> 01:10:22,020 when he's talking about his key 1839 01:10:26,930 --> 01:10:24,120 takeaways from this report stating that 1840 01:10:28,790 --> 01:10:26,940 you know he knows the number of um 1841 01:10:30,709 --> 01:10:28,800 you know whistleblowers basically uh 1842 01:10:33,950 --> 01:10:30,719 coming forward that know a lot about the 1843 01:10:36,169 --> 01:10:33,960 crash retrieval programs potentially 1844 01:10:38,390 --> 01:10:36,179 um and reverse engineering programs so 1845 01:10:39,950 --> 01:10:38,400 that that's really really huge so I 1846 01:10:42,110 --> 01:10:39,960 think my key takeaway for anyone who 1847 01:10:44,810 --> 01:10:42,120 feels that look arrows could do anything 1848 01:10:48,709 --> 01:10:44,820 it's going nowhere well first it's been 1849 01:10:49,970 --> 01:10:48,719 taken out of ousdins from asserting a 1850 01:10:53,689 --> 01:10:49,980 step which is great news which is 1851 01:10:58,189 --> 01:10:56,330 um and you know secondly I think we've 1852 01:10:59,689 --> 01:10:58,199 got this other thing which could blow a 1853 01:11:01,070 --> 01:10:59,699 lid on this whole thing in terms of the 1854 01:11:02,750 --> 01:11:01,080 whistlebler stuff 1855 01:11:04,729 --> 01:11:02,760 yeah I mean melon actually used the 1856 01:11:07,550 --> 01:11:04,739 words alien technology I do believe as 1857 01:11:10,689 --> 01:11:07,560 well he did absolutely getting excited 1858 01:11:13,790 --> 01:11:10,699 isn't he he's getting excited yeah 1859 01:11:16,189 --> 01:11:13,800 sorry but he's also he's also very very 1860 01:11:18,410 --> 01:11:16,199 cautious in his writing and he doesn't 1861 01:11:19,970 --> 01:11:18,420 he doesn't throw around a word without 1862 01:11:21,350 --> 01:11:19,980 thinking about it and thinking about the 1863 01:11:24,050 --> 01:11:21,360 ramifications of it so I think that's 1864 01:11:25,970 --> 01:11:24,060 important absolutely yeah he's like 1865 01:11:27,649 --> 01:11:25,980 Chris melon is someone who is he's 1866 01:11:29,149 --> 01:11:27,659 probably written a few of these similar 1867 01:11:31,550 --> 01:11:29,159 reports like this before you know that 1868 01:11:33,050 --> 01:11:31,560 go to like the the top of the top in 1869 01:11:34,370 --> 01:11:33,060 terms of like presidents and stuff like 1870 01:11:36,470 --> 01:11:34,380 that so 1871 01:11:38,930 --> 01:11:36,480 his wording the way that he's been 1872 01:11:40,729 --> 01:11:38,940 trained you have to always take that 1873 01:11:43,250 --> 01:11:40,739 into context and 1874 01:11:46,490 --> 01:11:43,260 um yeah so like Katie said it's hugely 1875 01:11:48,410 --> 01:11:46,500 important the words that he chooses 1876 01:11:50,750 --> 01:11:48,420 yeah absolutely just wanted to highlight 1877 01:11:53,630 --> 01:11:50,760 this comment from JD he says 1878 01:11:55,430 --> 01:11:53,640 the UAP Jia TF was much more informative 1879 01:11:57,350 --> 01:11:55,440 compartment I wonder if Dr Sean 1880 01:12:00,050 --> 01:11:57,360 Kirkpatrick has read into it SEC death 1881 01:12:03,590 --> 01:12:00,060 and communistratcom were 1882 01:12:04,729 --> 01:12:03,600 hmm dot jitatf cropped up I think it was 1883 01:12:07,070 --> 01:12:04,739 towards the end of last year and I can't 1884 01:12:09,350 --> 01:12:07,080 remember where but it's interesting to 1885 01:12:12,470 --> 01:12:09,360 know how much Kirkpatrick has been 1886 01:12:14,270 --> 01:12:12,480 brought up to speed as someone new to 1887 01:12:17,390 --> 01:12:14,280 the study of UAP and running an office 1888 01:12:19,370 --> 01:12:17,400 around UAP what's what historical 1889 01:12:20,570 --> 01:12:19,380 stuff have they shared or maybe more the 1890 01:12:22,669 --> 01:12:20,580 question is what has he actually caught 1891 01:12:24,350 --> 01:12:22,679 up with if he's been handed a whole lot 1892 01:12:27,050 --> 01:12:24,360 of stuff and he's had a limited time to 1893 01:12:31,149 --> 01:12:27,060 look into it I think that's really a 1894 01:12:37,669 --> 01:12:35,450 yes that was like what louisando 1895 01:12:40,790 --> 01:12:37,679 um was quoted as saying 1896 01:12:41,630 --> 01:12:40,800 um in my most recent story 1897 01:12:44,810 --> 01:12:41,640 um 1898 01:12:46,490 --> 01:12:44,820 so it was like now that arrow is no 1899 01:12:49,970 --> 01:12:46,500 longer under the chain of command of my 1900 01:12:52,850 --> 01:12:49,980 old office the ausdi I would support 1901 01:12:55,610 --> 01:12:52,860 increased authorities to Dr Kirkpatrick 1902 01:12:58,430 --> 01:12:55,620 in order to identify all U.S government 1903 01:13:00,709 --> 01:12:58,440 equities both past and present who may 1904 01:13:02,750 --> 01:13:00,719 have been slash are involved in UAP 1905 01:13:05,229 --> 01:13:02,760 studies so yeah you're definitely on the 1906 01:13:07,070 --> 01:13:05,239 right lines there yeah 1907 01:13:09,169 --> 01:13:07,080 I was just going to say he's just 1908 01:13:11,149 --> 01:13:09,179 clarified that the ji ATF was the Navy 1909 01:13:12,590 --> 01:13:11,159 compartment from submarine sensors so 1910 01:13:14,990 --> 01:13:12,600 thank you JD 1911 01:13:18,890 --> 01:13:15,000 sorry yeah I would say that the no no I 1912 01:13:20,750 --> 01:13:18,900 I would say that the 2023 ndaa 1913 01:13:23,689 --> 01:13:20,760 um I believe it was this year that 1914 01:13:27,470 --> 01:13:23,699 assigned the uh Arrow Authority directly 1915 01:13:30,110 --> 01:13:27,480 to dubsec uh depsect def Kathleen Hicks 1916 01:13:31,970 --> 01:13:30,120 I'd say that is very uh indicative of 1917 01:13:33,110 --> 01:13:31,980 the fact that he hopefully is getting 1918 01:13:36,169 --> 01:13:33,120 that 1919 01:13:39,290 --> 01:13:36,179 um Kathleen Hicks is one smart cookie 1920 01:13:42,410 --> 01:13:39,300 and she doesn't take a lot of 1921 01:13:44,330 --> 01:13:42,420 um so you know if there was anyone that 1922 01:13:48,550 --> 01:13:44,340 this office should report to I am 1923 01:13:52,850 --> 01:13:51,290 she's great yeah 1924 01:13:54,709 --> 01:13:52,860 here we go then what kind of information 1925 01:13:57,229 --> 01:13:54,719 would be necessary and sufficient for 1926 01:13:59,270 --> 01:13:57,239 UAP analysis so this is great how it 1927 01:14:00,350 --> 01:13:59,280 breaks down the multi kind of the 1928 01:14:02,689 --> 01:14:00,360 different angles that they can collect 1929 01:14:04,430 --> 01:14:02,699 data to look at and analyze and 1930 01:14:06,950 --> 01:14:04,440 the interesting thing that's in the UAP 1931 01:14:08,330 --> 01:14:06,960 report it did say in one of the parts 1932 01:14:11,090 --> 01:14:08,340 that it seemed that there was not enough 1933 01:14:13,310 --> 01:14:11,100 data or information to do a you know a 1934 01:14:14,750 --> 01:14:13,320 good analysis on it but 1935 01:14:17,330 --> 01:14:14,760 I think 1936 01:14:18,890 --> 01:14:17,340 the the probably is you know they've got 1937 01:14:20,810 --> 01:14:18,900 the witnesses they've got the sensor 1938 01:14:22,850 --> 01:14:20,820 data because census was mentioned so 1939 01:14:24,669 --> 01:14:22,860 many times in that report but it was 1940 01:14:26,750 --> 01:14:24,679 skipped over it was just yeah sentences 1941 01:14:28,970 --> 01:14:26,760 you know I think the fact that they're 1942 01:14:31,130 --> 01:14:28,980 talking about census so much they must 1943 01:14:32,930 --> 01:14:31,140 have so much information but 1944 01:14:35,050 --> 01:14:32,940 this is good and then again about the 1945 01:14:37,370 --> 01:14:35,060 Observer we're talking about uh 1946 01:14:39,110 --> 01:14:37,380 physiological psychological or other 1947 01:14:41,209 --> 01:14:39,120 effects apparently corresponding to the 1948 01:14:43,250 --> 01:14:41,219 UAP observation so they're definitely 1949 01:14:46,130 --> 01:14:43,260 highlighting the health effects here 1950 01:14:49,130 --> 01:14:46,140 there must be something to it you know 1951 01:14:50,570 --> 01:14:49,140 it's not just a what if there's no 1952 01:14:51,890 --> 01:14:50,580 health effects but report all the health 1953 01:14:54,649 --> 01:14:51,900 effects 1954 01:14:58,550 --> 01:14:56,090 he's quite quite interesting because 1955 01:15:00,950 --> 01:14:58,560 you'll remember with the um the the 1956 01:15:03,110 --> 01:15:00,960 Nimitz case Kevin Day basically said 1957 01:15:05,510 --> 01:15:03,120 that they acted as if they wanted 1958 01:15:07,070 --> 01:15:05,520 nothing to do with us 1959 01:15:08,870 --> 01:15:07,080 um and it looks as though like on the 1960 01:15:11,750 --> 01:15:08,880 East Coast as well that 1961 01:15:13,850 --> 01:15:11,760 you know they don't they seem quite 1962 01:15:16,070 --> 01:15:13,860 indifferent these objects 1963 01:15:18,470 --> 01:15:16,080 um although from a sense of uh relating 1964 01:15:19,850 --> 01:15:18,480 to Signature management 1965 01:15:22,010 --> 01:15:19,860 um I think it was Chad Underwood that 1966 01:15:24,229 --> 01:15:22,020 says you can see queues of jamming on 1967 01:15:26,630 --> 01:15:24,239 both your radar and your flare tape 1968 01:15:28,430 --> 01:15:26,640 which is quite interesting as well 1969 01:15:29,990 --> 01:15:28,440 absolutely and I think you know we could 1970 01:15:31,189 --> 01:15:30,000 literally break down this page but we're 1971 01:15:33,649 --> 01:15:31,199 not I'm not going to go to Every point 1972 01:15:35,270 --> 01:15:33,659 but this this UAP Behavior indicating 1973 01:15:38,330 --> 01:15:35,280 whether it is apparent intelligent 1974 01:15:41,149 --> 01:15:38,340 control response to Observation which is 1975 01:15:43,310 --> 01:15:41,159 very interesting uh Observer yeah 1976 01:15:44,930 --> 01:15:43,320 response to observation and or Observer 1977 01:15:47,450 --> 01:15:44,940 presence and apparent indications of 1978 01:15:50,030 --> 01:15:47,460 indifference or hostility I mean yeah 1979 01:15:52,250 --> 01:15:50,040 all of those little points are just so 1980 01:15:55,550 --> 01:15:52,260 valid and so important I mean yeah it's 1981 01:15:58,130 --> 01:15:55,560 just it's such a a rich slideshow and 1982 01:16:00,229 --> 01:15:58,140 again guys the report and this slideshow 1983 01:16:01,850 --> 01:16:00,239 if you haven't got them already the 1984 01:16:04,189 --> 01:16:01,860 links are in the description of this 1985 01:16:06,530 --> 01:16:04,199 video for you yourselves to go and uh 1986 01:16:09,649 --> 01:16:06,540 print out like Katie says read each line 1987 01:16:11,930 --> 01:16:09,659 and peruse and form your own conclusions 1988 01:16:13,850 --> 01:16:11,940 and you know that that's the end of the 1989 01:16:15,950 --> 01:16:13,860 slideshow but you know 1990 01:16:18,830 --> 01:16:15,960 again it's just so interesting that 1991 01:16:21,649 --> 01:16:18,840 there's the two documents are are so 1992 01:16:23,149 --> 01:16:21,659 different in their kind of writing and 1993 01:16:24,530 --> 01:16:23,159 scope 1994 01:16:25,550 --> 01:16:24,540 so yeah 1995 01:16:27,050 --> 01:16:25,560 um 1996 01:16:28,669 --> 01:16:27,060 do you think there's anything we haven't 1997 01:16:30,470 --> 01:16:28,679 touched upon that's worth mentioning 1998 01:16:32,630 --> 01:16:30,480 that's maybe just come out of this week 1999 01:16:33,890 --> 01:16:32,640 anything that's said in the media please 2000 01:16:37,550 --> 01:16:33,900 go for it 2001 01:16:39,590 --> 01:16:37,560 I'm Joey Carson man dropping dropping 2002 01:16:41,330 --> 01:16:39,600 that that word 2003 01:16:44,030 --> 01:16:41,340 um I think it's very interesting that 2004 01:16:46,189 --> 01:16:44,040 we're now talking about debris and you 2005 01:16:49,149 --> 01:16:46,199 said the debris wasn't interesting which 2006 01:16:51,470 --> 01:16:49,159 wasn't notable 2007 01:16:53,689 --> 01:16:51,480 notably alarming so what do you think 2008 01:16:55,430 --> 01:16:53,699 about being used no to be alarming what 2009 01:16:57,169 --> 01:16:55,440 in the world is it then because if it's 2010 01:16:59,510 --> 01:16:57,179 not notably alarming it's probably not 2011 01:17:01,130 --> 01:16:59,520 UAP it means we know what it is right so 2012 01:17:03,890 --> 01:17:01,140 like I have that just doesn't make any 2013 01:17:05,649 --> 01:17:03,900 sense to me and I also want to know who 2014 01:17:08,390 --> 01:17:05,659 cleared him to talk about that because 2015 01:17:10,070 --> 01:17:08,400 that is a huge admission that we have 2016 01:17:11,630 --> 01:17:10,080 some sort of debris 2017 01:17:14,030 --> 01:17:11,640 of something 2018 01:17:16,370 --> 01:17:14,040 yeah absolutely so if you saw something 2019 01:17:18,110 --> 01:17:16,380 that they got from Roswell like decades 2020 01:17:20,930 --> 01:17:18,120 ago it's like oh yeah we pulled this out 2021 01:17:22,729 --> 01:17:20,940 would you be notably alarmed knowing 2022 01:17:24,590 --> 01:17:22,739 that it's been in possession for decades 2023 01:17:26,930 --> 01:17:24,600 but no I wouldn't because it's not going 2024 01:17:29,810 --> 01:17:26,940 to do anything to us I'm not alarmed oh 2025 01:17:31,070 --> 01:17:29,820 my God what's he gonna do it's not two 2026 01:17:32,570 --> 01:17:31,080 senses there isn't there from a 2027 01:17:34,850 --> 01:17:32,580 congressional standpoint in terms of 2028 01:17:37,550 --> 01:17:34,860 you've not told us that's alarming 2029 01:17:41,450 --> 01:17:37,560 you've not told us that he said like 2030 01:17:43,669 --> 01:17:41,460 well you've had it for decades so yeah 2031 01:17:45,229 --> 01:17:43,679 that's that's how I saw it in that way 2032 01:17:46,430 --> 01:17:45,239 it's not that he's not we're not alarmed 2033 01:17:47,750 --> 01:17:46,440 by it because we're not worried about 2034 01:17:50,030 --> 01:17:47,760 what it's going to do or any 2035 01:17:51,770 --> 01:17:50,040 implications from that aspect So and 2036 01:17:54,050 --> 01:17:51,780 I've seen this on social media today 2037 01:17:56,390 --> 01:17:54,060 since posting that video that so many 2038 01:17:59,030 --> 01:17:56,400 people are reading these short quotes 2039 01:18:00,950 --> 01:17:59,040 from these uh important people and 2040 01:18:02,570 --> 01:18:00,960 really coming up with absolute opposites 2041 01:18:04,610 --> 01:18:02,580 depending how you see it and so that's 2042 01:18:06,590 --> 01:18:04,620 funny that Katie and I both just did 2043 01:18:08,870 --> 01:18:06,600 exactly the same thing there and it just 2044 01:18:12,169 --> 01:18:08,880 goes to see that when they're not using 2045 01:18:14,090 --> 01:18:12,179 really defined phrases and words and 2046 01:18:16,189 --> 01:18:14,100 they they are being vague that it can be 2047 01:18:18,590 --> 01:18:16,199 interpreted and this is where we 2048 01:18:21,709 --> 01:18:18,600 the way we end up I suppose 2049 01:18:27,709 --> 01:18:21,719 yeah I mean if I was still in DC 2050 01:18:31,010 --> 01:18:29,090 I'm saying so 2051 01:18:32,630 --> 01:18:31,020 what was that about you know and maybe 2052 01:18:35,090 --> 01:18:32,640 maybe that's what we need we need 2053 01:18:37,070 --> 01:18:35,100 someone to start the phone calls and 2054 01:18:40,010 --> 01:18:37,080 just ask for clarification you know 2055 01:18:42,709 --> 01:18:40,020 pepper them every day with tens of phone 2056 01:18:44,209 --> 01:18:42,719 calls until they issue a clarification 2057 01:18:46,189 --> 01:18:44,219 because that's a that's a pretty 2058 01:18:48,590 --> 01:18:46,199 remarkable thing to say whether you're 2059 01:18:50,270 --> 01:18:48,600 claiming it was notable or not 2060 01:18:51,830 --> 01:18:50,280 um I'm gonna do that right now I'm 2061 01:18:54,169 --> 01:18:51,840 getting in touch with his prep person 2062 01:18:56,030 --> 01:18:54,179 and ask him to Define no to be alarming 2063 01:18:57,770 --> 01:18:56,040 but from you know I'll do the same thing 2064 01:18:59,149 --> 01:18:57,780 I'll do the same thing I'll get off and 2065 01:19:00,770 --> 01:18:59,159 I'm going to call his office and say I 2066 01:19:01,870 --> 01:19:00,780 would like an explanation of what debris 2067 01:19:04,310 --> 01:19:01,880 you mean 2068 01:19:06,050 --> 01:19:04,320 amazing amazing but this is the thing 2069 01:19:08,689 --> 01:19:06,060 you know these people are put onto these 2070 01:19:11,149 --> 01:19:08,699 like Fox News CNN and all it'll take is 2071 01:19:13,070 --> 01:19:11,159 one slip up from one of these people and 2072 01:19:16,310 --> 01:19:13,080 like we're we can latch onto something 2073 01:19:18,370 --> 01:19:16,320 really meaty you know so let's hope that 2074 01:19:21,350 --> 01:19:18,380 we get that soon 2075 01:19:22,850 --> 01:19:21,360 Joe Biden accidentally 2076 01:19:24,590 --> 01:19:22,860 um led the charge into making gay 2077 01:19:27,290 --> 01:19:24,600 marriage illegal you know sometimes a 2078 01:19:29,689 --> 01:19:27,300 little slip actually results in policy 2079 01:19:31,550 --> 01:19:29,699 you know it had happened before it can 2080 01:19:34,550 --> 01:19:31,560 happen again so 2081 01:19:36,169 --> 01:19:34,560 yeah let's get that debris info yeah it 2082 01:19:38,149 --> 01:19:36,179 was good to have like 2083 01:19:40,070 --> 01:19:38,159 to a certain extent confirmation let's 2084 01:19:42,169 --> 01:19:40,080 say if it is the case because I've been 2085 01:19:45,530 --> 01:19:42,179 told that you know there's been multiple 2086 01:19:47,209 --> 01:19:45,540 testimonies from people allegedly 2087 01:19:49,130 --> 01:19:47,219 involved with these 2088 01:19:52,010 --> 01:19:49,140 um programs and they have provide 2089 01:19:53,870 --> 01:19:52,020 verifiable information look as I said 2090 01:19:56,209 --> 01:19:53,880 before the the Senate Intel committee 2091 01:19:57,350 --> 01:19:56,219 doesn't wake up one day and said you 2092 01:19:58,610 --> 01:19:57,360 know what I'm going to get my pen right 2093 01:20:01,130 --> 01:19:58,620 here I'm going to start drafting this 2094 01:20:03,350 --> 01:20:01,140 language right UFO whistleblow language 2095 01:20:05,030 --> 01:20:03,360 that doesn't come from nowhere I mean 2096 01:20:06,770 --> 01:20:05,040 they've had had a good reason to do it 2097 01:20:08,450 --> 01:20:06,780 and they have they've been talking to 2098 01:20:11,390 --> 01:20:08,460 these people behind the scenes for a 2099 01:20:13,070 --> 01:20:11,400 long time now and um that's where this 2100 01:20:14,510 --> 01:20:13,080 language has come from and you know what 2101 01:20:15,709 --> 01:20:14,520 only more whistle players have come 2102 01:20:17,870 --> 01:20:15,719 forward and they continue to come 2103 01:20:20,209 --> 01:20:17,880 forward from what I am hearing from 2104 01:20:22,070 --> 01:20:20,219 what's going on behind the scenes and I 2105 01:20:24,830 --> 01:20:22,080 think sooner or later a decision will 2106 01:20:25,790 --> 01:20:24,840 have to be made from Congress if it if 2107 01:20:31,070 --> 01:20:25,800 they are 2108 01:20:33,530 --> 01:20:31,080 is correct 2109 01:20:34,970 --> 01:20:33,540 and they've got all the answers that 2110 01:20:37,970 --> 01:20:34,980 they've asked 2111 01:20:40,669 --> 01:20:37,980 which at what point do they decide okay 2112 01:20:42,229 --> 01:20:40,679 do we go public about this and if you do 2113 01:20:44,810 --> 01:20:42,239 to what extent do we go public about 2114 01:20:47,229 --> 01:20:44,820 this do we go public about these 2115 01:20:50,090 --> 01:20:47,239 programs do we go public about apparent 2116 01:20:51,770 --> 01:20:50,100 non-human intelligence how is all that 2117 01:20:54,530 --> 01:20:51,780 handled 2118 01:20:56,810 --> 01:20:54,540 um they're the big questions aren't they 2119 01:20:58,490 --> 01:20:56,820 that's what needs to be worked out but 2120 01:21:00,410 --> 01:20:58,500 it feels good to be getting there we 2121 01:21:02,270 --> 01:21:00,420 heard Gary Nolan speaking I think 2122 01:21:04,070 --> 01:21:02,280 yesterday or the day before he's aware 2123 01:21:05,810 --> 01:21:04,080 of three people who have already 2124 01:21:07,850 --> 01:21:05,820 testified and these are not people we're 2125 01:21:10,189 --> 01:21:07,860 familiar with in the UFO Community these 2126 01:21:12,350 --> 01:21:10,199 would probably be people associated with 2127 01:21:14,689 --> 01:21:12,360 Legacy programs to some degree so I mean 2128 01:21:17,750 --> 01:21:14,699 that's very encouraging I don't want it 2129 01:21:20,750 --> 01:21:17,760 to be just UFO Talking Heads all the 2130 01:21:22,189 --> 01:21:20,760 time you know that's not what we want so 2131 01:21:26,990 --> 01:21:22,199 yeah 2132 01:21:28,729 --> 01:21:27,000 I think we've covered everything there I 2133 01:21:30,110 --> 01:21:28,739 mean we could really dial delve deeper 2134 01:21:32,510 --> 01:21:30,120 and deeper but you know I think we've 2135 01:21:34,370 --> 01:21:32,520 covered the basics and like Katie has 2136 01:21:35,810 --> 01:21:34,380 said you know go out there read these 2137 01:21:37,669 --> 01:21:35,820 things for yourself make your own 2138 01:21:39,410 --> 01:21:37,679 conclusions draw your own opinions and 2139 01:21:40,610 --> 01:21:39,420 and I think that is definitely best 2140 01:21:42,350 --> 01:21:40,620 because then we can all come together 2141 01:21:44,630 --> 01:21:42,360 and have these conversations online 2142 01:21:46,189 --> 01:21:44,640 about the different thoughts on it and 2143 01:21:48,830 --> 01:21:46,199 putting our heads together may help us 2144 01:21:51,649 --> 01:21:48,840 come to more understandings and things 2145 01:21:52,970 --> 01:21:51,659 maybe not but it can't hurt I just want 2146 01:21:55,010 --> 01:21:52,980 to give a shout out to everyone in the 2147 01:21:56,870 --> 01:21:55,020 live chat uh cake era here with the 20 2148 01:21:58,850 --> 01:21:56,880 pound donation thank you so much I 2149 01:22:00,470 --> 01:21:58,860 really appreciate that 2150 01:22:02,330 --> 01:22:00,480 um I don't you know beg for these things 2151 01:22:04,370 --> 01:22:02,340 uh so I really do appreciate everything 2152 01:22:07,310 --> 01:22:04,380 that you guys donate to the work that I 2153 01:22:10,310 --> 01:22:07,320 do because it all really helps 2154 01:22:12,169 --> 01:22:10,320 um Katie Chris thank you so much um I do 2155 01:22:13,970 --> 01:22:12,179 I suppose I should have to give a good 2156 01:22:17,030 --> 01:22:13,980 shout out to my friend Lou Elizondo 2157 01:22:19,310 --> 01:22:17,040 again for being so um free with his time 2158 01:22:20,870 --> 01:22:19,320 for me to speak about the report and 2159 01:22:22,790 --> 01:22:20,880 yeah guys thank you so much for being 2160 01:22:25,370 --> 01:22:22,800 here I really really do value you your 2161 01:22:27,050 --> 01:22:25,380 input it really does mean the world to 2162 01:22:29,750 --> 01:22:27,060 me as does your friendship so thank you 2163 01:22:32,930 --> 01:22:31,310 so yeah guys everyone in the live chat 2164 01:22:35,630 --> 01:22:32,940 again thank you so much I'm going to be 2165 01:22:37,910 --> 01:22:35,640 back on Wednesday with Tom Reed to talk 2166 01:22:41,209 --> 01:22:37,920 about his uh work in the UFO field his 2167 01:22:42,830 --> 01:22:41,219 sighting and more so yeah come and find 2168 01:22:45,950 --> 01:22:42,840 me on Wednesday hang out in the live